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Introduction 
 
Over 80% of Canadians use the Internet and approximately 20 million Canadians are active on 
social media networks.1 It is not surprising that criminal activity is taking place in these global 
digital communities and this is raising challenges for criminal law and the criminal justice 
system.2 The Supreme Court of Canada recently recognized in R. v. K.R.J.3 that “[t]he rate of 
technological change over the past decade has fundamentally altered the social context” in 
which certain crimes are occurring and social media networks have given “unprecedented 
access to potential victims and avenues” for offending.4  
 
This annotated Criminal Code aims to be a resource for scholars, judges, Crown prosecutors 
and defence counsel, police, and others interested in social media and criminal law. After the 
relevant Criminal Code provisions in bold, a brief description of the general law related to them 
appear, followed by a more detailed set of case summaries that describe the application of each 
provision in the social media context. These summaries are concise enough to identify 
potentially relevant judicial decisions quickly so that readers can then consult the full decisions. 
The following offences are covered in this annotated Criminal Code: 
 
• Participation in the activity in a terrorist group (s. 83.18) 
• Counselling the commission of an indictable offence for the benefit of, at the direction of or 
in association with a terrorist organization (ss. 2, 83.24-27, 464) 
• Public mischief (s. 140) 
• Sexual interference (s. 151) 
• Invitation to sexual touching (s. 152) 
• Sexual Exploitation (s. 153) 
• Voyeurism (s. 162) 
• Child pornography (s. 163.1) 
• Luring a child (s. 172.1) 
• Indecent acts (s. 173) 
• Criminal harassment (s. 264) 
• Uttering threats (s. 264.1) 
• Sexual assault (s. 265) 
• Inciting hatred (s. 319) 
• Unauthorized use of a computer (s. 342.1) 
• Extortion (s. 346) 
 
                                                
1  Statistics Canada, “Police-reported cybercrime in Canada, 2012”, by Benjamin Mazowita & 
Mireille Vézina, in Juristat, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014); Shea Bennett, 
“59% use Facebook in Canada (LinkedIn: 30%, Twitter: 25%, Instagram: 16%)”, Ad Week, (February 4, 
2015), online: <http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/canada-social-media- study/614360>.  
2  Maryke Silalahi Nuth, “Taking Advantage of New Technologies: For and Against Crime”, (2008) 
24:5 Computer L & Security Rev 437; Thaddeus Hoffmeister, “The Challenges of Preventing and 
Prosecuting Social Media Crimes”, (2014) 35:1 Pace Law Review 115.  
3  R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 SCR 906. 
4  Ibid, para 102. 
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Participation in activity of terrorist group 
 
83.18 (1) Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, 
any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist 
group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. 
 
Prosecution 
(2) An offence may be committed under subsection (1) whether or not 
(a) a terrorist group actually facilitates or carries out a terrorist activity; 
(b) the participation or contribution of the accused actually enhances the ability of a 
terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity; or 
(c) the accused knows the specific nature of any terrorist activity that may be 
facilitated or carried out by a terrorist group. 
 
Meaning of participating or contributing 
(3) Participating in or contributing to an activity of a terrorist group includes 
(a) providing, receiving or recruiting a person to receive training; 
(b) providing or offering to provide a skill or an expertise for the benefit of, at the 
direction of or in association with a terrorist group; 
(c) recruiting a person in order to facilitate or commit 
(i) a terrorism offence, or 
(ii) an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be a 
terrorism offence; 
(d) entering or remaining in any country for the benefit of, at the direction of or in 
association with a terrorist group; and 
(e) making oneself, in response to instructions from any of the persons who 
constitute a terrorist group, available to facilitate or commit 
(i) a terrorism offence, or 
(ii) an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be a 
terrorism offence. 
 
Factors 
(4) In determining whether an accused participates in or contributes to any activity of a 
terrorist group, the court may consider, among other factors, whether the accused 
(a) uses a name, word, symbol or other representation that identifies, or is 
associated with, the terrorist group; 
(b) frequently associates with any of the persons who constitute the terrorist 
group; 
(c) receives any benefit from the terrorist group; or 
(d) repeatedly engages in activities at the instruction of any of the persons who 
constitute the terrorist group. 
 
2001, c. 41, s. 4. 
 
* * * * * 
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General case law 
 
Essential elements — The actus reus of this offence is direct or indirect participation in, or 
contribution to, a terrorist group’s activity. S. 83.18(3) provides a list of behaviours to assist in 
determining what amounts to participation or contribution; s. 83.18(4) provides additional indicia 
of participation and contribution. This list does not expand the normal meaning of participation 
or contribution, it “simply allows the courts to ‘consider’ the factors identified”.1 S. 83.01(1) of the 
Criminal Code defines “terrorist activity” and “terrorist group” for the purposes of 83.18, with s. 
83.05 providing a non-exhaustive list of “listed entities” that qualify as terrorist groups.2 The 
mens rea of this offence has two components: first, the impugned act must be done “knowingly”; 
second, the accused must have a subjective purpose of improving a terrorist group’s ability to 
facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity.3 A purposive analysis of s. 83.18 excludes convictions 
for “(i) innocent or socially useful conduct absent any intent to enhance the abilities of a terrorist 
group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, and (ii) conduct that a reasonable person would 
not view as capable of materially enhancing the abilities of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry 
out a terrorist activity.”4 
— 1United States of America v. Nadarajah, 2010 ONCA 859, 09 OR (3d) 662, para. 18-19, 
aff’d Sriskandarajah v United States of America, 2012 SCC 70, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609. 
— 2United States of America v. Sriskandarajah, 2010 ONCA 857, 109 OR (3d) 680, para. 
17, aff’d Sriskandarajah v United States of America, 2012 SCC 70, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609. 
— 3United States of America v. Nadarajah, 2010 ONCA 859, 09 OR (3d) 662, para. 22, aff’d 
Sriskandarajah v United States of America, 2012 SCC 70, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609; R. v. 
Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 SCR 555, para. 46. 
— 4R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 SCR 555, para. 53. 
 
Charter concerns — freedom of expression — fundamental justice — The purpose of the 
terrorism legislation does not violate the Charter s. 2(b)’s protection of freedom of expression. 
There is also no evidence that the definition of “terrorist “activity” as per s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A) will 
have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. S. 83.18 is not overbroad, nor is its impact 
grossly disproportionate; as such, it does not violate s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
— R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 SCR 555. 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Evidence — The accused had, amongst other conduct, added a friend on Facebook from high 
school who had gone to Somalia to join Al-Shabaab, the terrorist group. This constituted 
evidence that the accused knew Al-Shabaab was a terrorist group.  
— R. v. Hersi, 2014 ONSC 4414, 115 W.C.B. (2d) 289. 
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Counselling the commission of an indictable offence 
for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association 
with a terrorist organization 
 
2 [...] "terrorism offence" 
 
"terrorism offence" means  
 
(a) an offence under any of sections 83.02 to 83.04 or 83.18 to 83.23, 
(b) an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament committed for 
the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group, 
(c) an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament where the act or 
omission constituting the offence also constitutes a terrorist activity, or 
(d) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, or being an accessory after the fact in 
relation to, or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in paragraph 
(a), (b) or (c); 
 
* * * * * 
 
83.24 Proceedings in respect of a terrorism offence or an offence under section 83.12 
shall not be commenced without the consent of the Attorney General. 
 
83.25 (1) Where a person is alleged to have committed a terrorism offence or an 
offence under section 83.12, proceedings in respect of that offence may, whether or 
not that person is in Canada, be commenced at the instance of the Government of 
Canada and conducted by the Attorney General of Canada or counsel acting on his or 
her behalf in any territorial division in Canada, if the offence is alleged to have 
occurred outside the province in which the proceedings are commenced, whether or 
not proceedings have previously been commenced elsewhere in Canada. 
(2) An accused may be tried and punished in respect of an offence referred to in 
subsection (1) in the same manner as if the offence had been committed in the 
territorial division where the proceeding is conducted. 
 
83.26 A sentence, other than one of life imprisonment, imposed on a person for an 
offence under any of sections 83.02 to 83.04 and 83.18 to 83.23 shall be served 
consecutively to 
(a) any other punishment imposed on the person, other than a sentence of life 
imprisonment, for an offence arising out of the same event or series of 
events; and 
(b) any other sentence, other than one of life imprisonment, to which the person 
is subject at the time the sentence is imposed on the person for an offence 
under any of those sections. 
 
83.27 (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, a person convicted of an indictable 
offence, other than an offence for which a sentence of imprisonment for life is 
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imposed as a minimum punishment, where the act or omission constituting the 
offence also constitutes a terrorist activity, is liable to imprisonment for life. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply unless the prosecutor satisfies the court that the 
offender, before making a plea, was notified that the application of that subsection 
would be sought. 
 
2001, c. 41, s. 4. 
 
* * * * * 
 
464. Except where otherwise expressly provided by law, the following provisions apply in 
respect of persons who counsel other persons to commit offences, namely, 
(a) every one who counsels another person to commit an indictable offence is, if 
the offence is not committed, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to the 
same punishment to which a person who attempts to commit that offence is 
liable; and 
(b) every one who counsels another person to commit an offence punishable on 
summary conviction is, if the offence is not committed, guilty of an offence 
punishable on summary conviction. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 464; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 60. 
 
* * * * * 
 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — S. 464(a) prohibits the counselling of an indictable offence, even where 
that offence is not committed by the person counselled. The actus reus for counselling is that 
the materials or statements made or transmitted actively induce or advocate, and do not merely 
describe, the commission of an offence. The mens rea is either of an intention that the offence 
counselled be committed, or knowingly counselled and was reckless as to whether the offence 
would be committed.1 S. 2 describes a “terrorism offence”, and states that the counselling of any 
of the proscribed terrorism offences is itself a terrorism offence. Ss. 83.24-83.27 provide for 
special procedures and sentencing provisions related to terrorism offences, most notably that 
they are subject to a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. This provision has been found 
not to offend the totality principle.2 
— 1 R. v. Hamilton, 2005 SCC 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 432.  
— 2 R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555. 
 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Evidence — Charter s. 7 — Police techniques to preserve evidence of social media 
activity — The accused had created a number of pro-ISIS Facebook pages, and made frequent 
posts on those pages, all of which were alleged to constitute counselling the commission of 
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indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist 
organization. The defence challenged the admission of screenshots of those posts based on s. 
7 of the Charter, and ss. 31.1-31.8 of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA), which deals with the 
admission of electronic documents. The defence argued that the screenshots were an 
insufficient method of preserving the posts as evidence. They argued that, instead, the police 
ought to have used forensic-grade software, which had been demonstrated to be available to 
them, to preserve the code underlying the posts, including any associated metadata, so as to 
allow for a later reconstruction of the entire post, including any surrounding context from the 
page on which the post was located.  
 
The court found that the Crown had failed to establish the integrity1 of the documents. The 
police officers that took the screenshots did not believe that they would be used as evidence in 
court, but only to generate further leads. As a result, they did not fully expand some truncated 
posts, and some screenshots contained artefacts that blocked part of the relevant post. This 
meant that the screenshots could not be compared with metadata later received via a Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty request related to the Facebook posts. The posts were nonetheless 
found to be authentic, as the investigating police officers could testify that they matched what 
was visible to them on the computer screen. The court noted, however, that the issue of 
authorship, that is, whether the accused actually created the posts, was a factual issue to be 
resolved at trial. 
 
Moving on to the best evidence rule, the court found that although the problems with the way 
that the screenshots were collected prevented the Crown from relying on the presumption of 
integrity under the CEA, nevertheless, they were the best available evidence, and ought to be 
admitted. 
 
Turning to the Charter s. 7 argument, the defence had argued that the metadata and other 
information that might have been captured by a more skilful search, using more advanced 
software, would be relevant evidence that would meet the relevant test for disclosure. The 
defence submitted that the failure to do so, and the deletion of some original screenshots, 
amounts to the loss and destruction of evidence. The court rejected this suggestion, and found 
that, although some evidence may have been lost, the RCMP did not act with unacceptable 
negligence, and later took steps to preserve evidence. As a result, no breach of s. 7 was found. 
 
— R. v. Hamdan, 2017 BCSC 676, [2017] B.C.J. No 986. 
— 1The court differentiated integrity from authenticity, noting that integrity requires that 
the documents be proven not to have been altered from their original form, whereas 
authenticity simply requires that the documents be confirmed to be what they purport or 
appear to be. Integrity is not to be addressed at the admissibility stage, but rather later 
upon weighing the evidence. 
 
 
Evidence – Charter s. 8 – Charter s. 10 – The accused was charged with four terrorism counts 
arising from posts he made on Facebook. The defence brought a pre-trial application for a 
remedy under s. 24(2) of the Charter for s 8 and s. 10(b) violations. In a previous pre-trial 
application, R v Hamdan, 2017 BCSC 467, the BCSC addressed the s. 10(b) violation and 
found that the accused’s s. 10(b) right was violated. The focus of this decision is the s. 8 
violation, which occurred when the RCMP searched the accused’s email accounts without 
judicial authorization. The Crown conceded that the s. 8 violation occurred. 
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The unlawful search was the result of a miscommunication between the officer who searched 
the accused’s email accounts and that officer’s superior. The court found that the search did not 
satisfy s. 24(2) because the impugned evidence was not obtained in a manner that denied or 
violated the accused’s rights. Admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute because the impact of the Charter-infringing conduct was relatively minor. 
In addition, the evidence was highly important to the case and likely unavailable from any other 
source. The defence application was dismissed. 
 
— R v Hamdan, 2017 BCSC 867, 2017 CarswellBC 1397 
 
Evidence — Collective assessment of Facebook posts — The accused was charged with 
four terrorism counts arising from posts he made on Facebook. Three of the counts were for 
counselling offences, which required the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused “actively induced” others to commit the indictable offences. The Crown’s position was 
that the Court could consider all 85 of the posts that were submitted as evidence collectively, as 
none of the posts could individually provide adequate proof of active inducement. The defence 
rejected that position, submitting that the posts were never meant to be read together as they 
were published in different contexts to different audiences over a ten-month period. The 
defence’s position was that any inferences drawn from the posts collectively would be 
unreliable. The court rejected the Crown’s argument, concluding that the collective content of 
the posts was inadequate to satisfy the Crown’s onus to establish the actus reus of the 
offences. The court accepted that it is possible in some circumstances to infer or find active 
inducement from a series of posts or comments on social media. However, it found that it would 
be illogical and unreasonable to read the posts together in this case because the collection of 
posts was very large and covered many topics. 
 
One particular post contained graphic details about how “lone wolves” may commit murder or 
assault, and invited “brothers of Islam in Egypt seeking jihad” to listen to that description. The 
court concluded that the post appeared to be an active inducement to others to commit murder 
and assault. However, based on missing context and the accused’s evidence about that missing 
context, the court did not accept that post as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also 
found that the Crown could not rely on the “lone wolf” post with respect to the count of inducing 
others to commit the offence of mischief in relation to property for the benefit of, at the direction 
of or in association with a terrorist group. As a result, the court found the accused not guilty on 
all counts. 
 
— R v Hamdan, 2017 BCSC 1770, 2017 CarswellBC 2708  
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Public mischief 
 
140 (1) Every one commits public mischief who, with intent to mislead, causes a peace 
officer to enter on or continue an investigation by 
(a) making a false statement that accuses some other person of having committed an 
offence; 
(b) doing anything intended to cause some other person to be suspected of having 
committed an offence that the other person has not committed, or to divert 
suspicion from himself; 
(c) reporting that an offence has been committed when it has not been committed; or 
(d) reporting or in any other way making it known or causing it to be made known that 
he or some other person has died when he or that other person has not died. 
 
Punishment 
(2) Every one who commits public mischief 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 140; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 19. 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — The actus reus of this offence can be any of the actions outlined in s. 
140(1)(a) to (d), provided that they cause a peace officer to begin or continue an investigation. 
The meaning of “offence” under s. 140 extends beyond crimes in the Criminal Code; it is 
equivalent to a “breach of law involving penal sanction”.1 It is unnecessary to establish on a voir 
dire the voluntariness of statements alleged to constitute the actus reus of a s. 140 offence.2 
“Reporting” can be to entities other than the police, such as the Children’s Aid Society or a 
prison official. If these organizations refer the report to the police, and the accused “intends that 
the police act upon it”, then all essential elements have been met.3 The mens rea of this offence 
is a specific intent to mislead a peace officer. Situations where a police officer does not, in fact, 
embark on an investigation, but the accused does have the requisite intent in making the false 
report, can be dealt with as an attempt to commit this offence.4 
— 1R. v. Howard (1972), 3 O.R. 119, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 211 (ONCA). 
— 2R. v. Stapleton (1982), 134 D.L.R. (3d) 239; 26 CR (3d) 361 (ONCA). 
— 3R. v. Delacruz (2009), 249 C.C.C. (3d) 501, 87 W.C.B. (2d) 55 (ON SC) at para. 15., aff’d 
in R v. Delacruz, 2013 ONCA 61, 105 W.C.B. (2d) 437. 
— 4R. v. Whalen (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 557, [1977] B.C.J. No. 1097 (PC) at para. 9-10, cited 
with approval in R. v. Poirier (1989), 101 N.B.R. (2d) 67, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 276 (NBCA). 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Definition of “Swatting” — “Swatting involves tricking an emergency service agency into 
dispatching an emergency response based on a false report of an ongoing critical incident. 
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Swatting can lead to the deployment of a range of emergency response teams including police, 
fire and bomb squads and the evacuation of businesses, schools or other public institutions.”  
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 4. 
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Sexual interference 
 
151 Every person who, for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of 
the body or with an object, any part of the body of a person under the age of 16 years 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not 
more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 
one year; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum 
punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 151; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 1; 2005, c. 32, s. 3; 2008, c. 6, s. 
54; 2012, c. 1, s. 11; 2015, c. 23, s. 2. 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — The actus reus of this offence is directly or indirectly touching any part 
of the body of a person under 16 years, either with the accused’s body parts or an object. The 
mens rea requires specific intent to touch for a sexual purpose.1 An “accused who intends 
sexual interaction of any kind with a child and with that intent makes contact with the body of a 
child ‘touches’ the child and is guilty” of sexual interference.2 Where the accused is found guilty 
of sexual assault and sexual interference, the Kienapple principle may prevent multiple 
convictions.3 
— 1R. v. Bone (1993), 85 Man. R. (2d) 220, 81 C.C.C. (3d) 389 (MBCA). 
— 2R. v. Sears (1990), 66 Man. R. (2d) 47, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 62 (MBCA). 
— 3 R. v. C.G.F., 2003 NSCA 136, 219 N.S.R. (2d) 277, para. 38-39; R. v. R.C.M., 2007 NLTD 
29, 798 A.P.R. 322; R. v. Lonegren, 2008 BCSC 1817, 81 W.C.B. (2d) 613; R. v. Alyea 
(1997), 100 B.C.A.C. 241, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2702, para. 3-4. 
 
Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of the complainant is no defence to, 
among others, an offence under s. 151. This limitation is not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.1 
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA). 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Establishing identity of accused as person who sent Facebook messages — “It defies 
rational belief that for two hours and forty-nine minutes…someone pretending to be [the 
accused] was sending and receiving approximately 80 Facebook messages on his account, 
while deleting each message so that [that accused], who was also on his Facebook account 
during that night, never saw any of the messages.”  
— R. v. I.W.S., 2013 ONSC 4162, 107 W.C.B. (2d) 518, para. 123. 
 
Establishing identity of accused as person who sent Facebook messages – The accused 
was charged with the sexual interference and sexual assault of his 4-year-old daughter. The 
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accused alluded to committing the offences in a Facebook communication with a family friend’s 
daughter. At trial, the accused denied molesting his daughter, and also denied ever 
communicating with the family friend’s daughter on Facebook. The court concluded that to 
believe someone other than the accused sent the Facebook messages would “strain credulity.” 
Further, “[t]he accused's denial of that damning piece of evidence entirely undermines his 
credibility on the central issues,” namely, his denial of the charged offences. 
— R. v. B.R., [2017] O.J. No. 3782, 2017 ONSC 4429, para 40, 54 
 
Use of inculpatory Facebook messages — After having touched the complainant’s breasts in 
her home while her parents were briefly absent, the accused returned to his home, and later 
sent the complainant an apology via Facebook messenger, which the accused then deleted 
before the complainant could show her parents. This apology, and another which was later 
received via text message to the complainant’s mother, were found to be equivocal, and so 
were given little weight by the court. 
— R. v. Douglas, 2017 CanLII 6878 (NL PC), [2017] N.J. No. 59.  
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain complainant’s age – The 15-year-old complainant told 
the accused that she was 24 years old. The court found that the complainant’s stated age was 
not inconsistent with her appearance or the information on her Facebook profile. The court 
concluded that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did 
not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age. 
— R. v. Konneh, 2019 ABQB 3, 2019 CarswellAlta 17 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain complainant’s age – The accused was charged with 
sexual interference and sexual assault. The court found that the complainant had pursued the 
developmentally delayed accused, who has an estimated grade four education. Taking this 
context into account, the court concluded the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the 
complainant’s age — the accused asked the complainant for her age, but “received a coy 
response”; he checked her Facebook page and found no birthdate; he knew she was attending 
high school; and his belief that she looked older than sixteen was corroborated by a photo filed 
as an exhibit. The court acquitted the accused on both charges. 
— R. v. C.G.V., [2017] O.J. No. 6485, 2017 ONCJ 850 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The court noted that the 
complainant lied about her age and her Facebook profile picture “shows a young person trying 
to seem significantly older than her 14 years” (para. 9). However, while the complainant may 
have been manipulative, this was “[a]ll the more reason” the 40-year-old accused should have 
made more inquiries into the complainant’s age before having sex with her (para. 56). The court 
convicted the accused of sexual interference and sexual assault. 
— R. v. Beckford, 2016 ONSC 1066, 28 W.C.B. (2d) 298. 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —Though there was no 
evidence as to whether the accused had access to the complainant’s full Facebook profile, it 
was plausible that the accused saw the complainant’s fake age on Facebook. This was one of 
eight factors that led the court to conclude there was reasonable doubt as to whether the 
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accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age. The court acquitted 
the accused of sexual assault and sexual interference. 
— R. v. Akinsuyi, 2016 ONSC 2103, 129 W.C.B. (2d) 515.  
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —The 17-year-old accused 
had a sexual relationship with the 12-year-old complainant. Among other things, the court found 
the complainant lied about her age and posted pictures of herself on Facebook designed to 
make her look sexually mature. The accused immediately terminated the relationship after the 
complainant told him she was twelve. The court acquitted the accused of sexual assault and 
sexual interference.  
— R. v. R.R., 2014 ONCJ 96, 112 W.C.B. (2d) 302. 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The complainant listed her 
age as 16 on Facebook, when she was in fact 12. The court noted it was common for youth to 
lie about their age to gain access to Facebook, thus the complainant’s behavior was not 
“particularly probative of dishonesty” (para. 47). On the facts, the court found the accused did 
not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age, and thus convicted him of 
sexual assault (and directed a conditional stay of proceedings on the sexual interference 
charge).  
— R. v. Z.I.D., 2012 BCPC 570, [2012] B.C.J. No. 3079. 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —The court accepted that the 
accused honestly believed the complainant was at least 16 or 17, in part due to the 
complainant’s listed age on Facebook, and the “general tenor of her website pages…[as] trying 
to portray herself as someone much older than thirteen” (para. 22). Other factors included racial 
difference and the accused’s recent arrival to Canada from St. Vincent. On the facts, the court 
found the accused to have taken reasonable steps to ascertain her age, and acquitted him of 
sexual assault and sexual interference.  
— R. v. Garraway, 2010 ONCJ 642, 92 W.C.B. (2d) 210. 
 
Subjective belief of the complainant’s age – The BCSC accepted that the 53-year-old male 
accused held the subjective belief that the 14-year-old male complainant was 16. The court 
came to this conclusion in part based on evidence from the complainant’s Facebook page, 
including the fact that his Facebook profile may have indicated that he was 16, and that it 
contained images in which he looked older. Ultimately however, the court determined that the 
accused failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age before engaging 
in sexual activity with him, and the accused was convicted. 
— R. v. Angel, 2018 BCSC 794 
 
Honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s age – The accused was charged with 
sexual interference and sexual assault. “Notwithstanding that the Complainant's Facebook 
profile identified her as 16 years old and said she went to the high school in Community B, and 
she had used filters on her profile pictures to enhance her apparent age, I am satisfied that 
these factors did not cause the Accused to have an honest belief that she was 16 years old or 
older. The Accused testified that he only looked at a few of the pictures. He did not claim that 
the Complainant's Facebook profile or photographs led him to believe that she was 16.” 
— R. v. J.M., [2017] N.J. No. 223, 2017 NLTD(G) 110, 139 W.C.B. (2d) 250, para 51 
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Constitutionality of retrospective application of s. 161(1) amendments — The 2012 s. 
161(1) amendments empower sentencing judges to prohibit sexual offenders from having any 
contact with a person under 16 years of age (s. 161(1)(c)), or from using the Internet or other 
digital networks (s. 161(1)(d)). The Supreme Court found that these amendments constitute 
punishment, and thus retrospectively applying them violates s. 11 of the Charter. Retrospective 
application of the s. 161(1)(c) contact provision fails the cost-benefit stage of the Oakes test, but 
retrospective application of the s. 161(1)(d) internet prohibition is saved by s. 1. Section 
161(1)(d) is directed at “grave, emerging harms precipitated by a rapidly evolving social and 
technological context”. Furthermore, an “Internet prohibition, while invasive, is not among the 
most onerous punishments, such as increased incarceration” (para. 114).  
— R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906. 
 
Sentencing —The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and breach of probation. The 
court treated the accused’s planned and deliberate contact of the victim through “Facebook 
(where teenagers live)” as an aggravating factor (para. 105).  
— R. v. Scott, [2014] 1117 A.P.R. 179, 121 W.C.B. (2d) 609 (NLPC). 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and 
luring a child. Among other conditions, the court imposed a s. 161 prohibition order for life, 
which included a prohibition on using the Internet or other digital network, unless for 
employment, seeking employment, or education. 
— R. v. Stanley (2014), 119 W.C.B. (2d) 419, [2014] O.J. No. 6378 (ONCJ). 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. The accused’s 
Facebook messages to the victim were used as evidence to show the accused’s manipulative 
behaviour and high risk for future sexual misconduct. The court thus emphasized the principles 
of denunciation and deterrence. Among other things, the court imposed a 3-year probation order 
that included a prohibition from owning, touching, or possessing any computer system or any 
other device capable of accessing the Internet.  
— R. v. Lamb, 2013 BCPC 137, 107 W.C.B. (2d) 199. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. Citing a report 
from the Sentencing Council for England and Wales, the court noted that the exchange of 
“sexual images” of the victim (in this case, over Facebook) was an aggravating factor (para. 11).   
— R. v. Nightingale, [2013] N.J. No. 31, 104 W.C.B. (2d) 1235 (NLPC). 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, 
sexual exploitation, harassment, and use of a forged document. All of the charges arose out of a 
six-year relationship that began when the complainant was 13 and the accused was 37. The 
accused was a firefighter who had acted as a first aid instructor to the complainant. After the 
complainant broke off contact with the accused, the accused’s harassment included following 
the complainant, waiting outside her home, and creating a fake Facebook profile under another 
name in order to get the complainant to contact him. The accused argued for a sentence of 10 
months, equivalent to the pre-trial time credited, but this was found to be insufficient given the 
serious and ongoing nature of the conduct, the serious impact on the complainant, and the 
accused’s abuse of a position of trust and authority. 
— R. c. Turcotte, 2017 QCCQ 318, EYB 2017-275806.  
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Invitation to sexual touching 
 
152 Every person who, for a sexual purpose, invites, counsels or incites a person under 
the age of 16 years to touch, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an 
object, the body of any person, including the body of the person who so invites, 
counsels or incites and the body of the person under the age of 16 years, 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not 
more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 
one year; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum 
punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 152; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 1; 2005, c. 32, s. 3; 2008, c. 6, s. 
54; 2012, c. 1, s. 12; 2015, c. 23, s. 3. 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — actus reus — The actus reus of this offence is fulfilled when the 
accused invites, counsels, or incites a child under 16 to touch a person, including the accused 
or the child themselves, for a sexual purpose.1 “Touch” should be interpreted purposively, 
consistent with Parliament’s objective to prevent sexual exploitation of children, and thus covers 
both actual and indirect touching.2 Touching need not have actually occurred, given that the 
“core verbs [of this offence] involve communication”; such communication can be express or 
implied.3 An accused’s request to touch the victim in a sexual manner can constitute the actus 
reus of this offence.4  
— 1R. v. Legare, 2008 ABCA 138, 429 A.R. 271, para. 33, aff’d R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56, 
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 551 on other grounds. 
— 2R. v. Fong, 1994 ABCA 267, 157 A.R. 73, para. 10. 
— 3 R. v. Legare, 2008 ABCA 138, 429 A.R. 271, para. 35, aff’d R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56, 
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 551 on other grounds. 
— 4R. v. Gray (2004), 190 O.A.C. 319, [2004] O.J. No. 4100 (ONCA). 
 
Essential elements — mens rea — The mens rea of this offence requires knowingly 
communicating for a sexual purpose with a person under 16 years old, where the accused 
either intended, or knew that there was a substantial and unjustified risk, that the child would 
receive that communication as being an invitation, incitement, or counselling to do the physical 
conduct that s. 152 prohibits.1 The mens rea must be present when the communication occurs, 
but such present intent does not need to be intent for imminent sexual touching. A trier of fact 
could infer from “dirty talk” that the accused had “present intent to manoeuvre the child 
psychologically towards sexual touching” by normalizing such touching through the “dirty talk”.2 
— 1R. v. Legare, 2008 ABCA 138, 429 A.R. 271, para. 40, aff’d in R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 
56, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551 on other grounds. 
— 2R. v. Legare, 2008 ABCA 138, 429 A.R. 271, para. 47, aff’d in R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 
56, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551 on other grounds. 
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Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of the complainant is no defence to, 
among others, an offence under s. 152. This limitation is not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.1 
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA). 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Invitation to sexual touching via Facebook — The accused’s sexual messages and “penis 
pictures” shared with the 15-year old complainant via Facebook were for the purpose of 
facilitating invitation to sexual touching. The accused was also found guilty of the offence of 
luring a child in s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.  
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302. 
 
Invitation to sexual touching via Snapchat — The accused and complainant began “sexting” 
each other when the complainant was only 15 years of age, including explicit Snapchats and 
Skyping where nude images were shared. The court found that this conduct constituted the 
offence of Invitation to Sexual Touching, even though “the Crown could not explain…why this 
crystal clear offence had no been charged” (para. 355).  
— R. v. J.J.O, 2016 ONCJ 264, 130 W.C.B. (2d) 665. 
 
Invitation to sexual touching via Facebook — After the 34-year-old accused had sexual 
intercourse with the 15-year-old complainant, he sent sexually explicit messages to the 
complainant’s Facebook account, inviting her to “finish what they had started the night before”. 
The judge found the accused knew he was sending messages to the complainant (as opposed 
to her 22-year-old cousin), and convicted him of invitation to sexual touching.   
— R. v. Clarke, 2016 SKCA 80, 480 Sask. R. 277. 
 
Facebook listed age rejected as evidence —The court rejected fresh evidence of the 
complainant’s listed age on Facebook, because the complainant had already told the accused 
over Facebook “in no uncertain terms” that she was 15. Thus, the age listed on her Facebook 
page “would be unlikely to overcome” the accused’s “clear understanding that the complainant 
was 15” (para. 112).    
— R. v. Clarke, 2016 SKCA 80, 480 Sask. R. 277. 
 
Facebook evidence to support complainant’s account of events — The complainant’s 
recollection of events from childhood and early adolescence was inconsistent, but the court 
found her credible in part because “the Facebook conversations [between the complainant and 
accused] are strong evidence supporting the complainant’s general account of events” (para. 
78). The accused’s denial of writing the Facebook messages was not believed.  
— R. v. J.S.M., 2015 NSSC 312, 127 W.C.B. (2d) 90. 
 
Constitutionality of retrospective application of s. 161(1) amendments — The 2012 s. 
161(1) amendments empower sentencing judges to prohibit sexual offenders from having any 
contact with a person under 16 years of age (s. 161(1)(c)), or from using the Internet or other 
digital networks (s. 161(1)(d)). The Supreme Court found that these amendments constitute 
punishment, and thus retrospectively applying them violates s. 11 of the Charter. Retrospective 
application of the s. 161(1)(c) contact provision fails the cost-benefit stage of the Oakes test, but 
retrospective application of the s. 161(1)(d) internet prohibition is saved by s. 1. Section 
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161(1)(d) is directed at “grave, emerging harms precipitated by a rapidly evolving social and 
technological context”. Furthermore, an “Internet prohibition, while invasive, is not among the 
most onerous punishments, such as increased incarceration” (para. 114).  
— R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and 
luring a child. Among other things, the court imposed a s. 161 prohibition order for life, which 
included a prohibition on using the internet or other digital network, unless for employment, 
seeking employment, or education. 
— R. v. Stanley (2015), 119 W.C.B. (2d) 419, [2015] O.J. No. 6378 (ONCJ). 
 
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court 
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time 
ago”; we better understand now the severe impact online sexual exploitation can have on 
children (para. 17). Consequently, the court found that it “must resort to imprisonment, 
emphasizing the sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and 
dismissed the accused’s argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18). 
— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing 
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other 
offences. In determining that the accused bore a high level of moral blameworthiness, the court 
noted the accused’s “use of the internet…has elements of disturbing online sexual harassment 
– an adult criminally cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless 
unknown entity,” he was also “all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).    
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to invitation to sexual touching. The court noted that 
“access to young persons by way of internet or cell phone text is so readily available that the 
court must attempt to deter others from engaging in this conduct” (para. 31). At the same time, 
the Facebook contact between the parties was an isolated chat, as opposed to messaging over 
a long period time. Consequently, the court went beyond the minimum of 90 days, but kept the 
sentence to the lower range of sentencing at 6 months incarceration.  
— R. v. Kanigan, 2014 SKQB 147, 445 Sask. R. 247. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to invitation to sexual touching, possession and 
distribution of child pornography, and transmission of sexually explicit material to a child. The 
accused’s proposed sentencing case law had significantly lower dispositions than what the 
Crown proposed. The court distinguished the accused’s proposed sentencing case law on the 
facts, and also noted “the legal landscape is evolving as Courts become more aware of the 
dangers that this type or sexual harassment and cyber bullying invokes” (para. 33).   
— R. v. N.L.G., 2015 MBCA 81, 323 Man. R. (2d) 73. 
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Sexual exploitation 
 
153 (1) Every person commits an offence who is in a position of trust or authority 
towards a young person, who is a person with whom the young person is in a 
relationship of dependency or who is in a relationship with a young person that is 
exploitative of the young person, and who 
(a) for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with 
an object, any part of the body of the young person; or 
(b) for a sexual purpose, invites, counsels or incites a young person to touch, directly 
or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, the body of any person, 
including the body of the person who so invites, counsels or incites and the body 
of the young person. 
Punishment 
(1.1) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not 
more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term 
of one year; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a 
minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days. 
Inference of sexual exploitation 
(1.2) A judge may infer that a person is in a relationship with a young person that is 
exploitative of the young person from the nature and circumstances of the relationship, 
including 
(a) the age of the young person; 
(b) the age difference between the person and the young person; 
(c) the evolution of the relationship; and 
(d) the degree of control or influence by the person over the young person. 
 
Definition of young person 
(2) In this section, young person means a person 16 years of age or more but under the 
age of eighteen years. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 153; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 1; 2005, c. 32, s. 4; 2008, c. 6, s. 
54; 2012, c. 1, s. 13; 2015, c. 23, s. 4. 
 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — s. 153 — The language in ss. 153 (a) and (b) is similar to that in ss. 151 
and 152, respectively, with the difference being that s. 153 applies to complainants between 16 
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and 18 years old. In addition to the different age range of the complainant, s. 153 also requires 
that the accused be in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant, a person with 
whom the complainant is in a relationship of dependency, or be in a relationship with the 
complainant that is exploitative of the complainant. Proof of mens rea is, of course, required for 
each element. The presence of any of the trust, authority, dependency, or exploitation 
relationships will suffice to make out this offence, and no proof is necessary that the accused 
actually abused their position or relationship by engaging in the prohibited conduct.1 
— 1R. v. Audet (1996), 2 S.C.R. 171, S.C.J. No. 61. 
 
Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of the complainant is no defence to, 
among others, an offence under s. 153(1). This limitation is not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.1 
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA). 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Sentencing — Sexual Interference (s. 153(1)(a)) — The accused, a substitute teacher in the 
16 year old complainant’s class, was found guilty at trial of Sexual Interference contrary to s. 
153(1)(a). Despite a probation report indicating that the accused was at a low risk of recidivism, 
the court found, after an exhaustive review of sentencing precedents and principles for this 
offence, that the accused’s position of trust as a teacher, and the importance of similarly 
situated individuals maintaining appropriate boundaries, required that the sentence emphasize 
general deterrence over rehabilitation. The court found this prioritization was necessary in order 
to communicate to teachers that their position of power renders their students incapable of 
consenting to sexual activity, even in the face of their students’, or their students’ parents’, 
apparent consent. Among the factors pointed to by the court as evidence of the accused’s 
failure to maintain appropriate boundaries was the accused having added the complainant as a 
friend on Facebook, where they later exchanged messages to plan the encounters that formed 
the subject matter of the charge. The accused was sentenced to six months of incarceration, 
double the 90-day mandatory minimum. 
— R. c. Lapointe, 2016 QCCQ 1951, J.E. 2016-796.  
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Voyeurism  
 
162 (1) Every one commits an offence who, surreptitiously, observes — including by 
mechanical or electronic means — or makes a visual recording of a person who is in 
circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, if 
(a) the person is in a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude, 
to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or to be engaged 
in explicit sexual activity; 
(b) the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her 
breasts, or is engaged in explicit sexual activity, and the observation or recording 
is done for the purpose of observing or recording a person in such a state or 
engaged in such an activity; or 
(c) the observation or recording is done for a sexual purpose. 
 
Definition of visual recording 
(2) In this section, visual recording includes a photographic, film or video recording 
made by any means. 
 
Exemption 
(3) Paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) do not apply to a peace officer who, under the authority of a 
warrant issued under section 487.01, is carrying out any activity referred to in those 
paragraphs. 
 
Printing, publication, etc., of voyeuristic recordings 
(4) Every one commits an offence who, knowing that a recording was obtained by the 
commission of an offence under subsection (1), prints, copies, publishes, distributes, 
circulates, sells, advertises or makes available the recording, or has the recording in his 
or her possession for the purpose of printing, copying, publishing, distributing, 
circulating, selling or advertising it or making it available. 
 
Punishment 
(5) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) or (4) 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
 
Defence 
(6) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the acts that are 
alleged to constitute the offence serve the public good and do not extend beyond what 
serves the public good. 
 
Question of law, motives 
(7) For the purposes of subsection (6), 
(a) it is a question of law whether an act serves the public good and whether there is 
evidence that the act alleged goes beyond what serves the public good, but it is a 
question of fact whether the act does or does not extend beyond what serves the 
public good; and 
(b) the motives of an accused are irrelevant. 
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R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 162; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 4; 2005, c. 32, s. 6. 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — s. 162(1) — Voyeurism is committed where a person 1) surreptitiously; 
2) observes or makes a visual recording (defined in s. 162(2)); 3) of a person who is in 
circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy; and 4) the actions outlined 
in 162(1)(a), (b), or (c) are fulfilled.1 There is debate as to whether “surreptitiously” includes an 
element of mens rea (i.e. that the accused must intend that the victim not know that they were 
being observed or recorded).2 Assessing a “sexual purpose” (as per s. 162(1)(c)) includes 
sexual gratification as a factor, but not a sole or essential factor.3 Without direct evidence, a 
court could infer that the purpose of photographing women’s buttocks is most likely sexual (as 
per s. 162(1)(c)), but that is not the only rational inference.4 The interpretation of privacy 
expectations under s. 162 “must keep pace with technological development”5 — for instance, it 
is reasonable for beach goers to expect that close-up imagery of one’s private areas “will not be 
captured as permanent record for the photographer, and potentially millions of others on-line”.6 
— 1R. v. Keough, 2011 ABQB 48, 501 A.R. 26. 
— 2R. v. Lebenfish, 2014 ONCJ 130, 112 W.C.B. (2d) 628. 
— 3R. v. Jarvis, 2015 ONSC 6813, 126 W.C.B. (2d) 598. 
— 4R. v. Taylor, 2015 ONCJ 449, 124 W.C.B. (2d) 56. 
— 5R. v. Rudiger, 2011 BCSC 1397, 98 W.C.B. (2d) 101, para. 117. 
— 6R. v. Taylor, 2015 ONCJ 449, 124 W.C.B. (2d) 56, para. 32. 
 
Essential elements — s. 162(4) — This section creates an offence of trafficking or possessing, 
for the purpose of trafficking, a recording made as a result of an offence under s. 162(1). This 
section includes a mens rea of actual knowledge that the recording was obtained by the 
commission of such an offence. This offence is considered more serious than those in s. 162(1). 
— R. v. Desilva, 2011 ONCJ 133, 93 W.C.B. (2d) 412, para. 20. 
 
Meaning of “reasonable expectation of privacy” — Though s. 162(1) requires assessing a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy”, using s. 8 Charter jurisprudence in this assessment should 
be pursued with caution. S. 8 interpretation is based on different principles than that of 
interpreting Code provisions: the expectation of privacy under s. 162 relates to a complainant, 
versus an accused under s. 8, and s. 8 typically addresses privacy interests that have limited 
relevance under s. 162 of the Code. Nevertheless, s. 8 jurisprudence is relevant to the extent 
that privacy is a “protean concept”, relevant considerations include that privacy must be 
assessed on the totality of the circumstances, that an expectation of privacy is a normative, 
rather than descriptive standard, and that a privacy inquiry protects people, not places.  
— R. v. Rudiger, 2011 BCSC 1397, 98 W.C.B. (2d) 101. 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Sentencing – The accused was convicted of criminal harassment and voyeurism. He had 
posted a sexually explicit video of the complainant on his Facebook page. He sent the link to 13 
friends and family, “inviting them to view the video”. The video was also sent as an attachment 
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to the emails. The court concluded there was no actual wide circulation of the video. However, 
“[g]iven the common use of social networking sites and their potential for enormous harm, 
general deterrence plays a significant principle in this sentencing” (para. 34).   
— R. v. Desilva, 2011 ONCJ 133, 93 W.C.B. (2d) 412. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to voyeurism. In determining the sentence, the court 
noted: “It seems to me that the principle focus of the sentence here should be denunciatory. It 
should also strive to deter this person and others from this type of offence. In this age of 
computers, "iPhones", Facebook, and YouTube, there is a very real risk that images like this 
could be disseminated around the world.” 
— R. v. F.G. (2011), 93 W.C.B. (2d) 416, 308 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 59 (NLPC). 
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Publication of an Intimate Image Without Consent 
 
162.1 (1) Everyone who knowingly publishes, distributes, transmits, sells, makes 
available or advertises an intimate image of a person knowing that the person depicted in 
the image did not give their consent to that conduct, or being reckless as to whether or 
not that person gave their consent to that conduct, is guilty 
(a) of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 
five years; or 
(b) of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
 
Definition of intimate image 
(2) In this section, intimate image means a visual recording of a person made by any 
means including a photographic, film or video recording, 
(a) in which the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal 
region or her breasts or is engaged in explicit sexual activity; 
(b) in respect of which, at the time of the recording, there were circumstances that 
gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy; and 
(c) in respect of which the person depicted retains a reasonable expectation of 
privacy at the time the offence is committed. 
 
Defence 
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the conduct that 
forms the subject-matter of the charge serves the public good and does not extend 
beyond what serves the public good. 
 
Question of fact and law, motives 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), 
(a) it is a question of law whether the conduct serves the public good and whether 
there is evidence that the conduct alleged goes beyond what serves the public 
good, but it is a question of fact whether the conduct does or does not extend 
beyond what serves the public good; and 
(b) the motives of an accused are irrelevant. 
 
2014, c. 31, s. 3 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements – Actus reus – The accused had dated the complainant on and off for 
about three years; during the off periods, the complainant dated B.L. The accused took a video 
of himself and the complainant having sex without her consent. After some confrontation 
between the accused and B.L., the accused sent a screenshot of the aforementioned video to 
B.L. The complainant testified the screenshot was taken from the accused’s Facebook profile, 
meaning the screenshot had been “made public on Facebook for some period of time” (para 
23). The accused was found guilty of making an intimate image of the complainant available 
without the complainant’s consent, contrary to s. 162.1 of the Criminal Code. 
— R. v. Verner, [2017] OJ No 3206, 2017 ONCJ 415 
 26 
 
Essential elements – s. 162.1(2)(a) – “intimate image” – The court considered whether the 
word “nude” was disjunctive or conjunctive with the other words of s. 162.1(2)(a), which 
constitutes one element of “intimate image”. The court found that the word “nude” was 
disjunctive, and as such, s. 161.1(2)(a) could be established in three ways: “where the person is 
nude; where the person's genital organ, anal region or breasts are exposed; or where they have 
engaged in explicit sexual activity” (para 43). Given the complainant was nude in the 
screenshot, s. 161(2)(a) was established. 
— R. v. Verner, [2017] OJ No 3206, 2017 ONCJ 415 
 
Essential elements – s. 162.1(2)(a) – “explicit sexual activity” – The court found that the 
word “nude” was disjunctive, and as such, s. 161.1(2)(a) could be established in three ways: 
“where the person is nude; where the person's genital organ, anal region or breasts are 
exposed; or where they have engaged in explicit sexual activity” (para 43). Given the 
complainant was nude in the screenshot, s. 161(2)(a) was established. The court found that the 
impugned screenshot could be considered “explicit sexual activity” under s. 161(2)(a). The 
screenshot depicts two nude parties, positioned near a bed; it was also “taken the context of an 
act of sexual intercourse” (para 64). 
— R. v. Verner, [2017] OJ No 3206, 2017 ONCJ 415 
 
 
Social media case law 
 
Fabrication of Facebook messages – The Crown’s position was that the accused attempted 
to extort the complainant using intimate images of her, and that he posted two such images on 
Facebook and Skype without her consent. The court found that, despite the complainant’s 
testimony to the contrary, she had sufficient knowledge of computers such that she could have 
accessed the accused’s Facebook account and feigned the offending messages which were 
presented at trial. The accused was acquitted on both counts. 
— R. v. Sobh, 2018 ONSC 2299 
 
Complainant’s consent to distribution of images – The Crown’s position was that the 
accused attempted to extort the complainant using intimate images of her, and that he posted 
two such images on Facebook and Skype without her consent. The court concluded that the 
complainant may have given blanket consent for the accused to post intimate images during 
their relationship. If her consent was later withdrawn, the Crown failed to demonstrate beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the relevant images were still on the Internet at that time. The accused 
was acquitted on both counts. 
— R. v. Sobh, 2018 ONSC 2299 
 
Sentencing – The accused recorded sexual acts between himself and the complainant, who 
was not aware of the recording and did not consent to it at the time it was made. The 
complainant did consent to the taking of nude photos as long as the accused did not distribute 
them. Nevertheless, the accused published the intimate videos and images on Facebook and 
Instagram. In concluding that a prison sentence was necessary to achieve the sentencing 
objectives of deterrence and denunciation, the court considered several aggravating factors. 
The court noted that the accused planned his offending behaviour, his actions were not 
momentary or impulsive, and that he could have stopped at any time but chose to proceed. The 
accused was sentenced to five months imprisonment followed by a 12-month probation term. 
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— R. v. Haines-Matthews, 2018 ABPC 264, 2018 CarswellAlta 2753 
 
Sentencing – In sentencing the offender, who pled guilty, the court was “mindful of certain 
realities” which suggested “a less severe sentence than those imposed in other situations”. The 
court distinguished these “realities” from “mitigating considerations”. One such reality was that 
the intimate images were not posted widely on the internet, but only to a limited and identified 
set of individuals who were the complainant’s family and friends. The court acknowledged that 
these circumstances likely heightened the complainant’s feeling of embarrassment, but 
indicated that these individuals were less likely to republish the images, thus lessening the 
lasting impact of the offence. 
— R. v. J.B., 2018 ONSC 4726 
 
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to distributing intimate images without the complainant’s 
consent. The accused had dated the complainant for three years. The distribution occurred via 
direct messaging on Instagram. The accused admitted he wanted revenge when he sent the 
pictures. Aggravating factors included the accused’s attempt to use the photos to extort the 
complainant to talk to him; abuse of the complainant’s trust; and the traumatic impact on the 
complainant. Mitigating factors included the accused’s expression of remorse; apparent 
appreciation of impact on the victim; and high chance of rehabilitation. The court imposed a 
conditional discharge with a three-year probation order, and a “significant community service 
order.” Further, the court noted the centrality of the Internet to a person’s everyday life, and that 
courts “should avoid imposing orders that create overbroad or unreasonable restrictions on an 
individual’s liberty”. Consequently, the accused was restricted from Internet use and social 
media access for the first six months of his probation, “rather than [under] the broader 
provisions of section 162.2”.  
— R. v. Calpito, [2017] O.J. No. 1171, para 111-112, 2017 ONCJ 129  
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Child pornography 
 
Definition of child pornography 
163.1 (1) In this section, child pornography means 
(a) a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether or not it was 
made by electronic or mechanical means, 
(i) that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of 
eighteen years and is engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit 
sexual activity, or 
(ii) the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose, 
of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age of eighteen 
years; 
(b) any written material, visual representation or audio recording that advocates or 
counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would 
be an offence under this Act; 
(c) any written material whose dominant characteristic is the description, for a sexual 
purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that 
would be an offence under this Act; or 
(d) any audio recording that has as its dominant characteristic the description, 
presentation or representation, for a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a 
person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act. 
   
Making child pornography 
(2) Every person who makes, prints, publishes or possesses for the purpose of 
publication any child pornography is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of one year. 
 
Distribution, etc. of child pornography 
(3) Every person who transmits, makes available, distributes, sells, advertises, imports, 
exports or possesses for the purpose of transmission, making available, distribution, 
sale, advertising or exportation any child pornography is guilty of an indictable offence 
and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum 
punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year. 
 
Possession of child pornography 
(4) Every person who possesses any child pornography is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 
years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of six months. 
 
Accessing child pornography 
(4.1) Every person who accesses any child pornography is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 
years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or 
 29 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of six months. 
 
Interpretation 
(4.2) For the purposes of subsection (4.1), a person accesses child pornography who 
knowingly causes child pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted to, himself or 
herself. 
 
Aggravating factor 
(4.3) If a person is convicted of an offence under this section, the court that imposes the 
sentence shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the person committed the 
offence with intent to make a profit. 
 
Defence 
(5) It is not a defence to a charge under subsection (2) in respect of a visual 
representation that the accused believed that a person shown in the representation that 
is alleged to constitute child pornography was or was depicted as being eighteen years 
of age or more unless the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of that 
person and took all reasonable steps to ensure that, where the person was eighteen 
years of age or more, the representation did not depict that person as being under the 
age of eighteen years. 
 
Defence 
(6) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the act that is alleged 
to constitute the offence 
(a) has a legitimate purpose related to the administration of justice or to science, 
medicine, education or art; and 
(b) does not pose an undue risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen years. 
 
Question of law 
(7) For greater certainty, for the purposes of this section, it is a question of law whether 
any written material, visual representation or audio recording advocates or counsels 
sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence 
under this Act. 
 
1993, c. 46, s. 2; 2002, c. 13, s. 5; 2005, c. 32, s. 7; 2012, c. 1, s. 17; 2015, c. 23, s. 7. 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Defining child pornography — “Person” in s. 163.1(1)(a) includes both actual and imaginary 
persons. An objective approach should be applied to the terms “depicted” in s. 163.1(1)(a)(i), as 
well as “dominant characteristic” and “sexual purpose in s. 163.1(1)(a)(ii). “Explicit sexual 
activity” in s. 163(1)(a)(i) refers to acts which viewed objectively fall at the extreme end of the 
spectrum of sexual activity (e.g. acts involving nudity or intimate sexual activity).1 S. 
163.1(1)(a)(ii), however, provides that materials that depict intimate areas of children are 
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extreme, without more.2 “Advocates or counsels” in s. 163.1(b) may include implicit messages in 
written material.3 
— 1R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45. 
— 2R. v. J.E.I., 2005 BCCA 584, 204 C.C.C. (3d) 137, para. 16. 
— 3R. v. Beattie, [2005] 75 O.R. (3d) 117, 196 O.A.C. 95 (ONCA). 
 
Proof of offence — 163.1 — “The normal inference that one intends the natural consequences 
of one's actions is applicable to computer usage just as it is to any other human activity [...]” 
— R. v. Missions, 2005 NSCA 82, 196 C.C.C. (3d) 253. 
 
Essential elements — 163.1(2) — “Making” —There is conflicting jurisprudence as to whether 
“making” child pornography includes or excludes copying existing child pornography onto a CD, 
DVD, hard drive, or other form of storage.  
— R. v. Keough, 2011 ABQB 48, 501 A.R. 26 (finding that mere copying will qualify as 
“making”). 
 
Essential elements — 163.1(3) — “Distribution” —Sharing files through an Internet file-
sharing program will fulfil the actus reus of this offence. The mens rea is intent, actual 
knowledge or wilful blindness that the pornographic material was being made available (not that 
the accused must knowingly, by some positive act, facilitate the availability of the material).1 In 
the context of file-sharing programs, where the accused is aware the program is based on open 
information sharing, it is logical to infer that the accused was aware he would be sharing 
information with third parties.2 However, where the accused deletes the child pornography files 
from the shared file, there may be reasonable doubt as to their intent to make child pornography 
available.3  
— 1R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 2 S.C.R. 212. 
— 2R. v. Johannson, 2008 SKQB 451, 335 Sask. R. 22. 
— 3R. v. Pressacco, 2010 SKQB 114, 352 Sask. R. 276. 
 
Essential elements — 163.1(4) — “Possession” —“Possession” is generally defined in s. 
4(3). Under s. 163.1(4), mere automatic caching of a file to a hard drive is insufficient to 
constitute possession; one must knowingly store and retain the file.1 Constructive possession 
may be found even where the accused aborted downloading and the images were never 
viewed.2 The accused must have knowledge of the content of the material in possession, but 
not that the material constituted child pornography.3 Evidence of the “accessing” offence in s. 
163.1(4.1) is not sufficient to establish the “possession” offence in s. 163.1(4).4 
— 1R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, 1 S.C.R. 253. 
— 2R. v. Daniels, 2004 NLCA 73, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 393. 
— 3R v Chalk, 2007 ONCA 815, 88 OR (3d) 448. 
— 4R v Farmer, 2014 ONCA 823, 318 C.C.C (3d) 322. 
 
Essential elements — 163.1(4.1) — “Accessing” — This offence is made out where the 
accused “knowingly caus[es] child pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted to, oneself.”1 
Viewing child pornography online constitutes the crime of accessing child pornography.2 
— 1R. v. R.D., 2010 BCCA 313, 489 W.A.C. 133. 
— 2R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, 1 S.C.R. 253. 
 
Essential elements — Defence of legitimate purpose — 163.1(6) — The defence in s. 
163.1(6) has two elements: 1) that the accused have a legitimate purpose for possessing the 
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material (five exhaustive categories of which are listed in s. 163.1(6)(a)), and 2) that the conduct 
complained of does not pose an undue risk of harm to persons under 18.1 On the first element, 
the purpose must be subjectively related to one of the five categories listed, and there must also 
be an “objectively verifiable” connection between the conduct and the stated legitimate purpose. 
Specifically, this requires an objective connection between the accused’s actions and purpose, 
and between that purpose and one or more of the protected categories.2 
— 1R. v. Katigbak, 2011 SCC 48, 3 SCR 326. 
— 2R. v. Katigbak, 2011 SCC 48, 3 SCR 326, para. 60. 
 
Charter concerns — Private use exception — S. 163.1(4) unjustifiably restricts freedom of 
expression in two scenarios: 1) where written materials or visual representations are created 
and held by the accused alone, exclusively for personal use; or 2) visual recordings, created by 
or depicting the accused, that depict lawful sexual activity and are held by the accused 
exclusively for private use. There is thus an exemption of such material from charges of making 
and possessing child pornography. 
— 1R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, 1 S.C.R. 45. 
 
Charter concerns — Private use exception — Availability of exception — The private use 
exception from Sharpe is only available where: 1) The sexual activity is lawful, including by 
reference to the offence of Sexual Exploitation contained in s. 153, 2) all participants consent to 
the recording, and 3) the recording is created and retained strictly for the private use of those 
involved.1  Threats to show a private recording to third parties should be considered in 
determining whether the private use exception applies.2 
— 1R. v. Barabash, 2015 SCC 29, 2 S.C.R. 522. 
— 2R. v. Dabrowski, 2007 ONCA 619, 86 O.R. (3d) 721. 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Definition child pornography — The complainant’s “selfies” depicted a young girl’s breasts. 
The court found that this constituted child pornography based on “common sense and judicial 
opinion” (para. 14). The Facebook messaging about the photographs was also sexualized, and 
it was immaterial that the accused was 16 years old at the time, even though he was not the 
accused that typically comes to mind when we think of harms associated with child 
pornography.   
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 14, 357 N.S.R. (2d) 340. 
 
Definition of child pornography — The accused downloaded several photos of a 15-year-old 
girl from her Facebook profile, then “doctored” them to make them sexual. This constituted child 
pornography.  
— R. v. Bowers, 2013 BCPC 383, 113 W.C.B. (2d) 63. 
 
Private use defence — Using a fake Facebook account to extort the complainant, the accused 
and his friend agreed to reveal the identity of the fake account in exchange for a sexual picture 
of the complainant. The complainant sent two selfies exposing her breasts, and the accused did 
not reveal his true identity. The private use defence fails, because the complainant’s consent to 
producing sexual images “was exploited, manipulated consent” (para. 47).   
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 14, 357 N.S.R. (2d) 340. 
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Making child pornography — Age of the complainant — The accused, the coach of a sports 
team, sent messages via text and Facebook to several players asking for photographs of their 
genitals. Some of the players provided such photos, for which the accused was convicted of 
making child pornography, as well as luring and exploitation offences. The accused was 
acquitted of the child pornography charges in relation to one complainant, as there was a 
reasonable doubt about whether the exchange of photographs had begun before or after the 
complainant’s 18th birthday, with the Crown only able to provide evidence of photos being sent 
after that day. 
— R. v. Cristoferi-Paolucci, 2017 ONSC 207, [2017] O.J. No. 1217. 
 
Possession for the purpose of distribution — The accused watched his friend use remote 
computer access to share sexual photos of the complainant to other people on Facebook. The 
accused’s decision not to shut the remote access “door” makes him party to his friend’s 
possession of child pornography for the purpose of distribution.  
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 14, 357 N.S.R. (2d) 340. 
 
Possessing and making child pornography available via Facebook and Twitter — seizure 
of cell phone — The warrantless seizure of the accused’s cell phone did not infringe s. 8 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The police had received reports via American 
authorities from Facebook and Twitter that a user had uploaded pornographic images of young 
males. After identification of the accused, in all of the circumstances, their decision to seize his 
cell phone without a warrant was reasonable to prevent an imminent danger of the loss or 
destruction of evidence.     
— R. v. Neill, 2016 ONSC 4963, 134 W.C.B. (2d) 457. 
 
Constitutionality of child pornography provisions’ scope — On appeal, the accused argued 
that new legal issues (gross disproportionality as a principle of fundamental justice, and Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, clarifying separate s. 7 and s. 1 analysis) justified 
reconsidering R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2. The court agreed and ordered a new trial. Regarding 
the accused’s argument that the aforementioned child pornography provisions also violate s. 15, 
the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision that s. 163.1(3) and (4) do not create a 
distinction on the basis of age of the offender.  
— R. v. M.B., 2016 BCCA 476, 135 W.C.B. (2d) 221. 
 
Constitutionality of mandatory minimum — The accused used hypotheticals to argue the 
mandatory sentencing provisions in s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code violated s. 12 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. One hypothetical imagined a 17-year-old female consensually 
taking and sharing sexual pictures with her 18-year-old boyfriend, who then shares the pictures 
with another, potentially on social media. Bound by R. v. Schultz (2008 ABQB 679), the court 
said the one-year mandatory minimum in this scenario would not violate s. 12.  
— R. v. Watts, 2016 ABPC 57, 31 Alta. L.R. (6th) 105. 
 
Identity of Facebook users on device – Child pornography was found on an iPhone belonging 
to the accused, but identity was at issue because the accused was not the sole user of the 
device. The iPhone was used to access two Facebook accounts which did not appear to belong 
to the accused; however, the evidence did not establish that those accounts were actually held 
by other individuals. The court noted that a person can adopt any name he or she wishes in 
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creating a Facebook account. Furthermore, there was no indication that other possible 
Facebook users used the phone for any purpose other than to access Facebook. 
– R. v. Paquette, 2018 BCSC 1462 
 
Sentencing – The accused lured six victims, all girls between 12 and 14 years old, using 
Snapchat. He coerced his victims into sending him nude photographs, which he saved and 
stored on his iPhone. In the sentencing decision, the court considered the fact that he never had 
a face-to-face meeting with any of his victims, finding that he did not demonstrate any intention 
to commit sexual acts with them. The court stated that this was not a mitigating factor, but 
instead removed from consideration factors that would otherwise justify a longer term of 
imprisonment. 
— R. v. Kron, 2018 ONCJ 622 
 
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to possession of child pornography and internet luring. 
The accused had created a fake Facebook identity to persuade an 11-year-old girl to engage in 
sexually explicit conversation, and send him sexually explicit pictures of herself. He also sent 
her pictures of an adult penis. Though the accused characterized his actions as a “stupid 
decision”, the court rejected this narrative and emphasized a high moral culpability. Specifically, 
the court noted the accused “was involved in the internet luring of a child through a medium in 
which children are particularly susceptible to influence because of the importance it plays in 
their daily lives: Facebook. To use Facebook in this manner illustrates a commitment to the 
commission of a sexual offence against a child which is alarming.”  
— R. v. Clarke, [2017] N.J. No. 230, 2017 NLPC 1317A00102, para 88 
 
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to making child pornography available. The judge found 
the accused’s actions — i.e. uploading pictures of young boys engaging in “sexual activities 
which are sexual assaults” — allowed an inference of “sufficient psychological harm to be bodily 
harm”. Additionally, the “bodily harm does not end when the photo or video is made, it continues 
each time, the image is viewed and distributed.” As such, the accused’s acts constituted a 
“violent offence” under s. 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and allowed for imposition 
of custody for a young offender. 
— R. v. G.D., [2017] O.J. No. 2308 
 
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of 11 counts of sexual interference and exploitation 
of four young children. About a decade later, he was subsequently convicted of sexual abuse of 
a two-year-old child, possessing and distributing (through Facebook) child pornography, and 
having breached a s. 161 order. Among other things, the accused was prohibited for life from 
using the Internet or other digital network, unless for counselling or employment and in the 
presence of the counsellor or employer.  
— R. v. Campbell (2017), 136 W.C.B. (2d) 468, [2017] N.J. No. 1 (PC). 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, possession of child pornography, and 
11 counts of extortion. The terms of his 18-month probation included, among other things: not 
possessing or using any computer or other device that has Internet access, except with 
advance written permission; monitored use of Internet access, if granted; and the accused’s 
identification by his full real name when communicating with anyone by means of a computer or 
other device, including via including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or any other social network.  
— R. v. R.W., 2016 ONCJ 325, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 68. 
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Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to possessing and making child pornography available. 
Among other things, his probation term included a condition to surrender any computer or 
electronic device, as well as his user ID or passwords, to the RCMP or to his probation officer if 
they ask, for inspection purposes. The sentencing judge specifically refrained from forbidding 
computer use, “because computers have a big place in our world” and “things like email and 
Facebook…can actually help [the accused] not feel as isolated” (para. 58).  
— R. v. King, 2016 NWTSC 29, 130 W.C.B. (2d) 85. 
 
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of extortion, possession of child pornography, and 
possession of child pornography for the purpose of distribution. Among other things, his 
conditional discharge order prohibited accessing any “internet based social media sites”. The 
court was concerned social media restrictions may impair the accused’s ability to overcome his 
social anxiety and reintegrate, but the nature of the accused’s offending made “it inappropriate 
to permit social media access” unless and until rehabilitative progress is made (para. 56).   
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 66, 366 N.S.R. (2d) 57. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual touching, possession and distribution of child 
pornography, and transmission of sexually explicit material to a child. The accused offered 
sentencing case law that had significantly lower dispositions than what the Crown proposed. 
The court distinguished the accused’s proposed cases on the facts, and also noted “the legal 
landscape is evolving as Courts become more aware of the dangers that this type or sexual 
harassment and cyber bullying invokes” (para. 33).   
— R. v. N.L.G., 2015 MBCA 81, 323 Man. R. (2d) 73. 
 
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of possession and distribution of child pornography. 
She made a fake Facebook account and posted a pornographic photo of the victim on the 
victim’s Facebook wall. The court deemed this a “planned offence that was vengeful” and “a 
form of bullying that society condemns” — thus, it would be “contrary to the public interest to 
allow [a discharge]” (para. 7). The distribution of the material through the anonymity of the 
Internet was also deemed an aggravating feature.  
— R. v. K.F., 2015 BCPC 417, 128 W.C.B. (2d) 653. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual touching, possessing and distributing child 
pornography, and transmitting sexually explicit material to a child. The court noted that “bullying 
and sexual exploitation of children, via social media, represents a new and disturbing 
phenomena in our society” (para. 1). It thus imposed, among other things, twelve months of 
supervised probation, which included a prohibition on accessing social media or possessing any 
device that provides access to the Internet.    
— R. v. N.G., 2014 MBPC 63, 311 Man. R. (2d) 286, varied on other grounds R. v. N.L.G., 
2015 MBCA 81, 124 W.C.B. (2d) 418. 
 
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court 
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time 
ago”; and that the court better understands now the severe impact online sexual exploitation 
can have on children (para. 17). Consequently, the court “must resort to imprisonment, 
emphasizing the sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and 
dismissed the accused’s argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18). 
 35 
— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing 
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other 
offences. In determining his high moral blameworthiness, the court noted the accused’s “use of 
the internet…have [sic] elements of disturbing online sexual harassment – an adult criminally 
cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless unknown entity,” he was also 
“all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).    
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to possessing child pornography. Among other things, 
the court imposed a two-year probation order prohibiting Internet or other digital network 
access.    
— R. v. Bowers, 2013 BCPC 383, 113 W.C.B. (2d) 63. 
 
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of 53 counts related to child pornography, including 
posting, accessing, and producing child pornography on Facebook. His use of Facebook to 
meet other like-minded individuals was considered an aggravating factor. Among other things, 
the court imposed a 20-year s. 161 order prohibiting the accused from using a computer system 
for the purpose of communicating with a person less than 16 years old. 
— R. v. Pattison, 2012 SKQB 330, 403 Sask. R. 145. 
 
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of possessing child pornography and luring. The 
offences related to the sending of a single photo by the complainant to the accused. The 
accused had gone too far in what was a misguided attempt to relate to a young person who 
faced similar difficulties to those faced by the accused during his youth in the same community, 
and this case was distinguished from the majority of child pornography cases involving large 
“collections”. The accused was Aboriginal, posed no risk of recidivism, and had been on highly 
restrictive bail conditions without breaches for 5 years. The sentencing proceeded on the 
provisions as they stood in 2011, with no minimum for the luring, and 14 days minimum for the 
child pornography. The accused was sentenced to 60 days intermittent on the child 
pornography charge, and a 9-month conditional sentence on the luring charge. 
— R. v. Crant, 2017 ONCJ 192, [2017] O.J. No. 1493. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and distribution of child 
pornography. The accused had produced videos of sexual interference with the daughter of his 
partner, and had tweeted a pornographic video of an unrelated minor, accompanied by a 
caption suggesting sexual predation. This tweet was what initially alerted the police to the 
accused’s activities. The court rejected an argument by the accused that the posting of a single 
image should attract only the mandatory minimum sentence. The court found that, given the 
“abhorrent” nature of the tweet and the image it contained, more than the minimum was 
required. The accused was sentenced to 15 months on the child pornography charge, and 24 
months consecutive on the sexual interference. As well, the three-year probation order to follow 
the time in custody included a term requiring the accused to provide details of their cellphone 
and Internet service accounts, and allow a probation officer to inspect any devices used for 
accessing the Internet. 
— R. v. C.A.H., 2017 BCPC 79, [2017] B.C.J. No. 528. 
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Sentencing — Sentencing of a young person for making child pornography available. The 
accused had posted 10 images of child pornography to Twitter. Many of the images depicted 
children being subjected to violent sexual abuse, which qualified as bodily harm. The offence 
was found to be a violent offence pursuant to s. 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act 
(YCJA), and so a custodial sentence was available. However, pursuant to s. 38(2)(i) of the 
YCJA, custody was not the least restrictive sentence capable of achieving the purposes of 
sentencing in this situation, and so a 2-year term of probation was ordered. 
— R. v. G.D., [2017] O.J. No. 2308, 2017 CarswellOnt 6619 (ONCJ). 
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Luring a child 
 
172.1 (1) Every person commits an offence who, by a means of telecommunication, 
communicates with 
(a) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 18 years, for the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence with respect to that person 
under subsection 153(1), section 155, 163.1, 170, 171 or 279.011 or subsection 
279.02(2), 279.03(2), 286.1(2), 286.2(2) or 286.3(2); 
(b) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 16 years, for the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under section 151 or 152, 
subsection 160(3) or 173(2) or section 271, 272, 273 or 280 with respect to that 
person; or 
(c) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 14 years, for the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under section 281 with 
respect to that person. 
 
Punishment 
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not 
more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 
one year; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum 
punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months. 
 
Presumption re age 
(3) Evidence that the person referred to in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) was represented to 
the accused as being under the age of eighteen years, sixteen years or fourteen years, as 
the case may be, is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that the accused 
believed that the person was under that age. 
 
No defence 
(4) It is not a defence to a charge under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) that the accused 
believed that the person referred to in that paragraph was at least eighteen years of age, 
sixteen years or fourteen years of age, as the case may be, unless the accused took 
reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person. 
 
2002, c. 13, s. 8; 2007, c. 20, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 14; 2012, c. 1, s. 22; 2014, c. 25, s. 9; 2015, 
c. 23, s. 11. 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — The actus reus of s. 172.1(1)(a), (b), and (c) has two elements: 1) 
communicating by means of a computer system (as defined by s. 342.1 (1)), and 2) with a 
person under the designated age, or with a person the accused believes to be under the 
designated age. Where it has been represented to the accused that the person they are 
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communicating with is underage, the accused is presumed to have believed that person was in 
fact underage. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence the accused took reasonable 
steps to ascertain the real age of the person.1 The mens rea of 172.1(a), (b), and (c) is a 
specific intent to facilitate the commission of one of the designated offences with the person with 
whom the communication is made.2 It is worth noting, however, that this quasi-inchoate offence 
may involve some overlap between the actus reus and the mens rea, and distinguishing the two 
may not be helpful.3 “Facilitating” includes “helping to bring about” and “making easier or more 
probable”. Sexually explicit language may be sufficient to establish this criminal purpose, but is 
not necessary.4 The accused need not meet or intend to meet the victim to actually commit the 
designated secondary offences, nor must the designated offence have to be factually possible.5 
— 1R. v. Levigne, 2010 SCC 25, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
— 2R. v. Alicandro, 2009 ONCA 133, 95 O.R. (3d) 173, leave to appeal refused [2009] 
S.C.C.A. No. 395. 
— 3R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551, para. 38-39. 
— 4R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551. 
— 5R. v. Alicandro, 2009 ONCA 133, 95 O.R. (3d) 173, para. 32, leave to appeal refused 
[2009] S.C.C.A. No. 395. 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Luring a child via Facebook — The accused’s sexual messages and “penis pictures” shared 
with the 15-year old complainant via Facebook were for the purpose of facilitating invitation to 
sexual touching under s. 152 of the Criminal Code, so he was found guilty of the offence of 
luring a child in s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.  
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302. 
 
Luring a child via Facebook — The 34-year-old accused was a teacher and house leader at a 
private boarding school attended by the 17-year-old complainant. The court ruled their 
Facebook communications were for the purpose of facilitating their sexual encounters, which 
were previously decided to constitute the offence of sexual exploitation. The accused was 
consequently convicted of luring a child. 
— R. v. Olson, 2016 BCPC 150, 130 W.C.B. (2d) 664. 
 
Luring a child via Facebook — In determining the accused’s intention in sending Facebook 
messages to the complainant, the court noted there were no explicitly sexual messages. 
However, considering the uncle-niece context and evidence as a whole, the court found the 
“only reasonable conclusion is that the accused was repeatedly communicating with the 
[complainant]…to make it easier for him” to have sexual contact with her (para. 108).  
— R. v. Skin, 2016 BCSC 2468, 136 W.C.B. (2d) 228. 
 
Luring a child via Facebook — The 19-year-old accused sent sexual messages — including a 
picture of his penis — to the 14 and 13-year-old complainants via Facebook and text messages. 
This was for the purpose of facilitating invitation to sexual touching under s. 152 of the Criminal 
Code, so he was found guilty of two counts of luring a child. 
— R. v. M.J.A.H., 2014 ONCJ 31, 111 W.C.B. (2d) 770. 
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Luring a child via Facebook — The court found that the accused “sought out a potential victim 
when she made a Facebook friend request” of the complainant. The accused’s subsequent 
befriending online “fostered a relationship of trust…with a view to advancing the [accused’s] 
ultimate goal to procure [the complainant] into prostitution” (para. 114). Consequently, the 
accused was found guilty of luring a child. 
— R. v. K.O., 2014 ONCJ 277, [2014] O.J. No. 2792. 
 
Luring a child via Facebook — The 40-year-old accused sent sexual messages to “a young 
girl” (a police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl). The messages were sent for the purpose of 
facilitating invitation to sexual touching under s. 152 of the Criminal Code, so the accused was 
found guilty of the offence of luring a child. 
— R. v. McCall, 2011 BCPC 7, 92 W.C.B. (2d) 573. 
 
Luring a child via Facebook — The accused, who was the brother-in-law of the complainant, 
was convicted of two counts of s. 151 sexual interference, s. 152 invitation to touching, and s. 
172.1 luring. The luring charge arose from Facebook messages sent in order to arrange 
occasions to meet, which gave rise to some of the s. 151 and s. 152 charges. Although only one 
count of luring had been charged, the judge found that every separate invitation sent by 
Facebook could have supported a distinct charge of luring. 
— R. c. F.D., 2013 QCCQ 17822, [2013] J.Q. no 20351, aff’d on other grounds F.D. c. R., 
2016 QCCA 317, 128 W.C.B. (2d) 420. 
 
Sentence reduction for alleged breach of s. 8 rights — Interception of communication —
The accused claimed that the failure of the police to obtain an authorization under s. 184.2 of 
the Criminal Code to intercept his communications was a breach of the Charter, an argument 
that was accepted on sentencing and led to a 2-month reduction in sentence. On appeal, that 
section was found not to apply, as interception requires that the police be acting as a third party 
to the communication. Here, the accused was communicating directly with a police officer, albeit 
under the pretence that the officer was a 14-year-old girl. When the police made electronic 
copies of the communications using a computer program that was not an interception. 
— R. v. Mills, 2017 NLCA 12, [2017] N.J. No. 55. 
 
Establishing identity of the accused – Similar fact evidence – The accused was charged 
with multiple luring offences, in relation to 15 boys. The Crown argued the accused used two 
different fake online identities (on Facebook and MSN) to communicate with the complainants 
and entice them into participating in sexual acts for payments. The accused denied all of the 
charges, and denied that he had any link to the impugned online profiles. The Crown made a 
similar fact application, contending there was striking similarity that established “that the same 
person committed all the luring acts in the indictment, and that there was some evidence linking 
[the accused] to the acts” (para 198). Accepting this similar fact application, the court found that 
the facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused authored the messages from the 
Facebook profile (para 419-431). Consequently, he was convicted of the luring charges.  
— R. v. McColeman, [2017] O.J. No. 4294, 2017 ONSC 4019 
 
Establishing identity of accused as person who sent Facebook messages — The accused 
denied any knowledge of Facebook messages (from an account under his name) sent to an 
undercover police officer. The court deemed “there was nothing beyond the messages 
themselves and the fragments recovered from the computer to connect the email and chat 
messages” to the accused (para. 46). As a result, the charge failed on identity.  
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— R. v. Mills (2014), 118 W.C.B. (2d) 207, 359 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 336 (NLPC). 
 
Establishing identity of accused as person who sent Facebook messages — The accused 
admitted to the RCMP that he communicated with the complainant on Facebook. The court also 
noted the accused’s theory that he did not send the messages “defies logic”, as it “makes no 
sense for an unknown third party to impersonate on Facebook [the accused], a person whom 
the complainant has known for most of her life” (para. 29). 
— R. v. Harris, 2010 PESC 32, 89 W.C.B. (2d) 247. 
 
Reasonable steps to ascertain age of the complainant – After meeting the 13-year-old 
complainant in person, the appellant lured him over Facebook. The appellant submitted that he 
took reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant, and argued a defence of 
mistaken belief that the complainant was over 16 years of age. Several factors suggested that 
the complainant was of a young age, including: the complainant had a youthful appearance 
when the accused first met him, and the complainant’s Facebook profile picture was a photo of 
the complainant as a child. The appellant had asked the complainant his age in a Facebook 
message, but the complainant did not respond. The appellant took no further steps to ascertain 
the complainant’s age. The court found that a reasonable person would have asked more 
questions in the circumstances. The court upheld the conviction and dismissed the appeal. 
— R. v. Crant, 2018 ONSC 1479 
 
Accused’s belief he was communicating with someone older —Using fake Skype and 
Facebook accounts, an undercover officer posed as a 15-year-old boy interested in the 
accused’s Craigslist solicitation for sex from young boys. The court rejected the accused’s 
testimony that he believed an adult was using the accounts, in part, because it “would seem an 
unlikely prospect for someone just ‘playing a game’ on the internet” to manufacture false 
Facebook and Skype accounts (para. 61).  
— R. v. Froese, 2015 ONSC 1075, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 577. 
 
Accused’s belief he was communicated with someone older —The accused passed along 
personal information to an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl on Facebook. 
This was found to be inconsistent with his belief that he was actually communicating with an 
older man who might threaten or extort him. The court also rejected that the accused would 
spend hours chatting to an older man out of boredom, since this was inconsistent with the 
accused’s purported fear the older man could threaten or extort him. 
— R. v. McCall, 2011 BCPC 7, 92 W.C.B. (2d) 573. 
 
Accused’s belief he was communicating with someone older — The accused’s testimony 
as to his belief that the 12-year-old complainant was 18 was not credible. The accused had lied 
about his own age on his Facebook profile, and so ought to have known that people lie about 
their age on Facebook. The complainant told him she was 16 years or older (“16 ans et plus”), 
which was an ambiguous response that should have caused the accused to make further 
enquiries. The accused was found to have been wilfully blind as to the age of the complainant.  
— Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales c. Rayo, 2017 QCCQ 128, [2017] J.Q. 
no 216. 
 
Accused’s belief he was communicating with someone older — In denying he intended to 
communicate with a 13-year-old, the accused claimed children use texting and Facebook more 
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frequently than Internet Relay Chat (IRC), which he was using. Taking the evidence as a whole, 
the court rejected the accused’s argument.   
— R. v. R.J.S., 2010 NSSC 253, 88 W.C.B. (2d) 694. 
 
Accused’s belief he was communicating with someone older — The accused 
communicated with an undercover officer who was posing as a 15-year-old girl via Craigslist 
and Facebook. The accused also recorded his thoughts about the exchanges in a private word 
processing document. During their conversations, the accused had expressed some 
equivocation about his belief that the complainant was underage, and about the activities they 
might engage in, but the private document was convincing evidence that he believed the 
complainant was 15, and that he intended to facilitate sexual contact with her. 
— R. v. Drury, 2017 ONSC 2330, [2017] O.J. No. 2002. 
 
Use and deactivation of Facebook account by accused — “This deactivation [of the 
accused’s Facebook account] and the numerous cell phone message deletions are more than 
coincidental and infer a current or very recent effort to destroy evidence. The accused's 
argument that someone else may have used his email account is a statement made without any 
air of reality” (paras. 215-6). 
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302. 
 
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence — The complainant’s mother printed 
out Facebook messages between the complainant and the accused’s alleged Facebook 
account, then provided them to the police. The court ruled the Facebook conversations were 
provided without any state action and thus immune from Charter scrutiny.  
— R. v. Lowrey, 2016 ABPC 131, 40 Alta. L.R. (6th) 163. 
 
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence —The complainant consented to the 
police taking over her Facebook account for investigative purposes. The accused argued the 
extraction of information from this Facebook investigation breached his s. 8 rights. For a variety 
of reasons, the court deemed his expectation of privacy unreasonable, and thus s. 8 was not 
engaged. Even if this expectation of privacy analysis was incorrect, the complainant had 
consented to a search of her Facebook account, and thus the search and seizure was 
undertaken with lawful authorization. Therefore, there was no s. 8 violation.  
— R. v. Lowrey, 2016 ABPC 131, 40 Alta. L.R. (6th) 163. 
 
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence — The court applied section 31.1 of 
the Canada Evidence Act to copies of Facebook messages the accused sent to a victim, which 
were used as evidence at trial. The victim’s review of the copies and testimony that the copies 
were accurate was found to be capable of supporting the authenticity of evidence, as section 
31.1 requires. 
— R. v. J.S.M., 2015 NSSC 312, 127 W.C.B. (2d) 90. 
 
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence — The police took screen captures of 
the accused’s Facebook profile, and of their communications with the accused while they were 
undercover. The court ruled the screen captures were admissible and “more akin to a photo or 
real evidence” than to officer’s investigative notes. Thus, s. 30(10) of the Canada Evidence Act 
did not apply to them.  
— R. v. Mills, 118 W.C.B. (2d) 207, 359 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 336 (NLPC). 
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Facebook messages as evidence of sexual intention – The accused sent many Facebook 
messages of a sexual nature to the 13-year-old complainant. The court accepted these 
Facebook messages as evidence of the accused’s sexual interest in the complainant and the 
accused’s hope of establishing a sexual relationship. 
— R. v. Dawe, 2018 CarswellNfld 205 
 
Seizure of evidence – The appellant was arrested at the door to his apartment. The arresting 
officers accompanied him into his home, and one officer observed an open computer which 
displayed an open Facebook page listing the appellant’s email address. The page read “Your 
account has been deactivated”. The officer seized the computer. The appellant argued that this 
was a breach of his s 8 rights under the Charter, as the officers did not have a search warrant. 
The court concluded that, under s. 489(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, officers are entitled to seize 
items they believe constitute evidence of the offence. As the computer was open and in plain 
view, the officers were entitled to seize it. 
— R. v. A.H., 2018 ONCA 677 
 
Collection of evidence from Facebook – The appeal court addressed the process used to 
obtain information from Facebook, and how it relates to trial delay. Here, the Crown was 
required to engage Canada’s Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States, and 
requested an administrative subpoena of Facebook for IP addresses, email addresses, aliases, 
and chat messages. The court held that, while the resulting delay constituted institutional delay, 
it was not extraordinary delay requiring special treatment. Still, the court emphasized that when 
the Crown engages the assistance of the US using the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, the 
Crown is expected to oversee the process and make efforts to minimize undue delay. 
— R. v. Kaulback, 2018 NLCA 8 
 
Charter rights during undercover police investigations on Facebook — The police posed 
as underage girls and communicated with the accused via Facebook and email. They used a 
computer program to record these conversations, and extracted information to run checks on 
the accused in the CPIC and ICAN databases. The police did not have authorization for these 
activities under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code or through a general warrant. This, added to the 
accused’s expectation of privacy to his email and Facebook, meant the police’s actions 
breached the accused’s s. 8 rights. The court also expressed unease that the police’s 
undercover account had “friended” other people (some minors), whose identities “were in effect 
conscripted into surveillance” without consent (para. 39). 
— R. v. Mills (2013), 110 W.C.B. (2d) 408, 343 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 128 (NLPC). 
— See contra, R. v. N.J.S, 2014 BCSC 2658, [2014] B.C.J. No. 3504, para. 70, where the 
court distinguished Mills and held: “In my opinion, e-mails that have been sent and 
received between individuals who are unknown to each other do not fall within the 
definition of electronic communications found in s. 183 of the Code”. 
 
Constitutionality of mandatory minimum penalty — The court created and considered a 
reasonable hypothetical of a 19-year-old using a smartphone to solicit a 16-year-old for nude 
photos. Without any argument from counsel, the court concluded a 90-day jail sentence would 
not be grossly disproportionate for this situation. It expressed “significant hesitation and 
reluctance” making this judgement, and noted “on a more complete record, it may well be 
determined that the 90-day minimum jail sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offence 
described” (paras. 71-73).  
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— R. v. S.S., 2014 ONCJ 184, 113 W.C.B. (2d) 160. 
 
Constitutionality of retrospective application of s. 161(1) amendments — The 2012 s. 
161(1) amendments empower sentencing judges to prohibit sexual offenders from having any 
contact with a person under 16 years of age (s. 161.1(1)(c)), or from using the Internet or other 
digital networks (s. 161(1)(d)). The Supreme Court found that these amendments constitute 
punishment, and thus retrospectively applying them violates s. 11 of the Charter. Retrospective 
application of the s. 161(1)(c) contact provision fails the cost-benefit stage of the Oakes test, but 
retrospective application of the s. 161(1)(d) internet prohibition is saved by s. 1. Section 
161(1)(d) is directed at “grave, emerging harms precipitated by a rapidly evolving social and 
technological context”. Furthermore, an “Internet prohibition, while invasive, is not among the 
most onerous punishments, such as increased incarceration” (para. 114).  
— R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906. 
 
Appropriate remedy for destruction of evidence — To create space on the forensic server, 
the police deleted imaged hard drives of the complainant and accused’s computer. As a result 
of this negligent failure to preserve and disclose evidence, the accused was unable to mount a 
full answer and defence. The court granted a stay of proceedings. 
— R. v. Kelly, 1109 A.P.R. 123, 118 W.C.B. (2d) 25 (NLSC). 
 
Charter s. 11(b) Jordan application for judicial stay of proceedings based on delay in 
disclosure — 18 months were required in order for the Crown to make full disclosure of 
materials obtained via analysis of the accused’s computer and a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MLAT) request to the United States in order to obtain information from Facebook. It was 
found to be unreasonable to expect the accused to make an election or hold a preliminary 
inquiry before this essential disclosure was received, and it was noted that only one of the 
accused’s elections was done with the benefit of full disclosure, and so no delay could be 
attributed to the accused’s three (re-)elections. Part of the delay was attributed to a single 
civilian police employee having responsibility for all computer forensic work required on this 
matter, as well as an incomplete initial response received from Facebook that delayed the 
MLAT process by a total of 18 months. A stay was granted as a remedy for a breach of the 
accused’s Charter s. 11(b) to trial without delay, pursuant to R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 
1 S.C.R. 631. 
— R. v. Kaulback, [2017] C.C.S. No. 1444, 2017 CanLII 7095 (NLPC). 
 
Sentencing –The accused lured six victims, all girls between 12 and 14 years old, using 
Snapchat. He coerced his victims into sending him nude photographs, which he saved and 
stored on his iPhone. In the sentencing decision, the court considered the fact that he never had 
a face-to-face meeting with any of his victims, finding that he did not demonstrate any intention 
to commit a sexual act with them. The court stated that this was not a mitigating factor, but 
instead removed from consideration factors that would otherwise justify a longer term of 
imprisonment. 
— R. v. Kron, 2018 ONCJ 622 
 
Sentencing – The Canadian offender communicated with four young girls in the United 
Kingdom for the purpose of committing sexual offences against them. He used Instagram and 
another social media platform called “ooVoo”. In a victim impact statement, one victim 
discussed the social isolation she faced following the offences. She explained that her friends 
would exclude her from certain conversations because they knew her parents monitored her 
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accounts. The court took victim impact into account in sentencing, noting that “One can hardly 
comprehend the impact that Mr. Carter's actions will have upon [one of the victims] and her 
family as she grows older.” 
— R. v. Carter, 2018 CarswellNfld 28, para 53 
 
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to internet luring. “The Court of Appeal has emphasized 
that the sentences imposed for online child luring must serve to safeguard children who are 
indefatigable users of the Internet from those predators who would abuse this technology to lure 
them into situations where they can be sexually exploited and abused.” As such, this crime 
ordinarily demands a custodial sentence. The judge imposed a s. 161(1) order, including a 
prohibition on “using the Internet, or any similar communication service, to access any content 
that violates the law or to directly or indirectly access any social media sites, social network, 
Internet discussion forum or chat room, or maintain a personal profile on any such service (for 
example Facebook, Twitter, Tinder, Instagram or any equivalent or similar service).” 
— R. v. Gucciardi, [2017] O.J. No. 5974, 2017 ONCJ 770, para 45, 74 
 
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to possession of child pornography and internet luring. 
The accused had created a fake Facebook identity to persuade an 11-year-old girl to engage in 
sexually explicit conversation, and send him sexually explicit pictures of herself. He also sent 
her pictures of an adult penis. Though the accused characterized his actions as a “stupid 
decision”, the court rejected this narrative and emphasized a high moral culpability. Specifically, 
the court noted the accused “was involved in the internet luring of a child through a medium in 
which children are particularly susceptible to influence because of the importance it plays in 
their daily lives: Facebook. To use Facebook in this manner illustrates a commitment to the 
commission of a sexual offence against a child which is alarming.”  
— R. v. Clarke, [2017] N.J. No. 230, 2017 NLPC 1317A00102, para 88 
 
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of luring a child. Since his s. 8 Charter rights were 
violated during an undercover Facebook investigation, his sentence was reduced. A request for 
a stay of proceedings was rejected. 
— R. v. Mills, 1136 A.P.R. 237, 120 W.C.B. (2d) 235 (NLPC). 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual assault, prostitution of a person less than 18 
years old, failure to comply with a recognizance, and luring a child. Among other things, the 
sentencing judge prohibited the accused from Internet use for 20 years, and from owning or 
using any mobile device with Internet capabilities. The Court of Appeal deemed this order as 
unnecessary for advancing the objective of protecting children, given the Internet may be 
required for a “myriad or innocent and perhaps unavoidable activities” (para. 26). Furthermore, 
“Section 161(1)(d) permits the courts to prohibit Internet use but does not provide the court with 
the power to restrict ownership of such Internet capable devices” (para. 27). The replacement 
order included a 20-year prohibition of using a computer to communicate with a person under 
16 years old, except for immediate family members, and prohibited Internet use “or any similar 
communication service to…directly or indirectly access any social media sites, social network, 
Internet discussion forum, or chat room, or maintain a personal profile on any such service,” 
including Facebook (para. 29).  
— R. v. Brar, 2016 ONCA 724, 134 O.R. (3d) 103. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, possession of child pornography, and 
11 counts of extortion. The terms of his 18-month probation included, among other things: not 
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possessing or using any computer or other device that has Internet access, except with 
advance written permission; monitored use of Internet access, if granted; and the accused’s 
identification by his full real name when communicating with anyone by means including 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or any other social network.  
— R. v. R.W., 2016 ONCJ 325, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 68. 
 
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of luring a child. The accused’s creation of three 
false Facebook identities for luring was deemed “alarming and frightening” (para. 75), especially 
since Facebook is a “medium in which children are particularly susceptible to influence because 
of the importance it plays in their daily lives” (para. 79). The court concluded both Crown and 
defense sentencing submissions did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence. 
Among other things, the court imposed a 10-year prohibition of using the Internet or other digital 
network to contact any person under 18 years of age, except the two children he lived with.  
— R. v. M.C., 2016 CanLII 83, 127 W.C.B. (2d) 435 (NLPC). 
 
Sentencing — Crown appeal of sentence. The accused’s use of the Internet to lure was a 
serious aggravating factor that justified at least a three-year sentence of imprisonment. 
However, the appropriate global sentence of three-and-one-half years’ imprisonment was not 
imposed, because of the lengthy delay of more than one-and-a-half years beyond what was 
usual for a substantive appeal.  
— R. v. Hajar, 2014 ABCA 222, 577 A.R. 57. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child and breaching probation. Among other 
things, the court imposed a 10-year supervision order, which included prohibiting possession or 
use of any device with Internet access, or accessing any other digital network, without advance 
written permission of the supervisor.  
— R. v. Slade, 2015 ONCJ 8, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 533. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child. Among other things, the court imposed 
a 12-month probation order, which included prohibiting the accused from owning, possessing, 
accessing, or using a device that can access the Internet, except for employment, education, or 
other purposes after obtaining written permission from a probation officer.  
— R. v. M.G.P., 2015 SKPC 80, 477 Sask. R. 263. 
 
Sentencing —The accused pled guilty to luring a child and distributing sexually explicit material 
to a child. The court noted his sexual Facebook messaging to three girls lacked “the 
sophistication and predatory anonymity of many offenders”; this was one reason the court was 
less willing to find the accused should be separated from society for a long time (paras. 73, 78). 
Among other things, the court imposed a probation order, which included conditions not to 
possess or use any device that access the internet, except with prior written permission; if 
permission is given, the accused must provide passwords and allow monitoring. 
— R. v. Callahan-Smith, 2015 YKTC 3, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 417. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child and making sexually explicit material 
available to a child. Among other things, the court imposed a three-year probation period, 
including conditions of not possessing any device capable of accessing the Internet, and not 
using any electronic device to access chat rooms or social networking sites.  
— R. v. Smith, 2014 ONCJ 543, 116 W.C.B. (2d) 655. 
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Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. An aggravating 
factor was his Internet use, which amounted to a “virtual home invasion” and was “specifically 
designed to evade any parental oversight” (para. 17). Among other things, the court imposed a 
3-year probation period, including prohibition of contact in person or by means of 
telecommunication, with anyone under the age of 16 (unless supervised by an appropriate 
person).  
— R. v. Hajar, 2014 ABQB 550, 116 W.C.B. (2d) 655. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and 
luring a child. Among other things, the court imposed a s. 161 prohibition order for life, which 
included a prohibition on using the Internet or other digital network, unless for employment, 
seeking employment, or education. 
— R. v. Stanley, [2014] O.J. No. 6378, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 419 (ONCJ). 
 
Sentencing — The developmentally-delayed accused pled guilty to offences of luring a child 
and breach of recognizance. Among other things, the court imposed a 15-month probation 
period that required him not to use the Internet or other digital network, unless under the 
supervision and in the immediate presence of an adult.  
— R. v. S.S., 2014 ONCJ 184, 113 W.C.B. (2d) 160. 
 
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court 
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time 
ago”; we better understand now the severe impact online sexual exploitation can have on 
children (para. 17). Consequently, the court “must resort to imprisonment, emphasizing the 
sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and dismissed the accused’s 
argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18). 
— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing 
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other 
offences. In determining his high moral blameworthiness, the court noted the accused’s “use of 
the internet…have [sic] elements of disturbing online sexual harassment – an adult criminally 
cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless unknown entity,” he was also 
“all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).    
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. Citing a report 
from the Sentencing Council for England and Wales, the court notes that exchange of “sexual 
images” of a victim (in this case, over Facebook) is an aggravating factor (para. 11).   
— R. v. Nightingale, 1030 A.P.R. 60, 104 W.C.B. (2d) 1235 (NLPC). 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. The accused’s 
Facebook messages to the victim were used as evidence to show the accused’s manipulative 
behaviour and high risk for future sexual misconduct. The court thus emphasized the principles 
of denunciation and deterrence. Among other things, the court imposed a 3-year probation order 
that included a prohibition of owning, touching, or possessing any computer system or any other 
device capable of accessing the Internet.  
— R. v. Lamb, 2013 BCPC 137, 107 W.C.B. (2d) 199. 
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Sentencing — The accused was found guilty after a jury trial of luring a child. The majority of 
the communication occurred on an online dating site, as well as by text message and Facebook 
chat. Sentencing was conducted on the basis of the provisions of s. 172.1 before the 
introduction of a mandatory minimum. The fact that the complainant was a real young person, 
as opposed to fictitious, as where undercover police engage the accused, was considered 
aggravating. 
— R. c. Allard, 2014 NBBR 261, 118 W.C.B. (2d) 430 (NBQB). 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to counts of s. 151 sexual interference, and s. 172.1 
luring. The Crown appealed against a 90-day intermittent sentence given by the trial judge, 
arguing for a 15-18 month range. On appeal, the defence maintained the original sentence was 
appropriate. The court confirmed the trial judge’s identification, as an aggravating factor, of a 
pattern of manipulation, moving from the virtual to the real. The court described inappropriate 
chat messages and sharing of intimate photos, which occurred mostly on an adult dating 
website, but also via Facebook, as a prelude to the sexual touching. The court also found that 
the trial judge gave insufficient weight to the importance of premeditation, in the form of 
grooming the victim via the luring offence, as a predicate to the sexual interference (paras. 50-
52). The court found that the absence of violence, other than the inherent violence of the 
offence, was not a mitigating factor (para. 56). 
— R. c. Bergeron, 2013 QCCA 7, 110 W.C.B. (2d) 784. 
 
Sentencing — The accused plead guilty to one count each of s. 172.1 luring, s. 151 sexual 
interference, and s. 152 invitation to sexual touching. The serious touching offences were 
planned in detail via Facebook messages, giving rise to the charge of luring. The court found 
that the fact that the victim was between 15 and 16 at the time of commission of the offence was 
not a mitigating factor. Relying on R. c. Arbut, 2009 QCCA 46, [2009] J.Q. no 150, the court 
found that the sentence for the luring offence should be consecutive to any sentence for the 
ultimate sexual interference or invitation to touching offences, but with consideration for the 
totality principle. A global sentence of 27 months, with 12 months for the luring offence, and 15 
consecutive months for the interference and invitation offences, was ordered. 
— R. c. Fortin, 2015 QCCQ 1369, [2015] J.Q. no 1513. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to one count each of luring and sexual interference. 
Thousands of messages had been exchanged by text message, Facebook, and Skype. A 14 
month sentence was imposed, with 11 months for luring, and three months consecutive for the 
sexual inference, which were the sentences sought by the crown. The fact that the luring had 
proceeded to physical contact was an aggravating factor for sentencing on the luring offence. 
There was extensive discussion of the totality principle as well as a finding that, even if they 
might be part of the same “criminal adventure”, these two offences are sufficiently distinct so as 
not to offend the rule in R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 SCR 729. 
— R. v. Dominaux (2017), 136 W.C.B. (2d) 218, [2017] N.J. No. 16 (NLPC). 
 
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of possessing child pornography, and luring. The 
offences related to the sending of a single photo by the complainant to the accused. The 
accused had gone too far in what was a misguided attempt to relate to a young person who 
faced similar difficulties to those faced by the accused during his youth in the same community. 
The accused was Aboriginal, posed no risk of recidivism, and had been on highly restrictive bail 
conditions without breaches for 5 years. The sentencing proceeded on the provisions as they 
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stood in 2011, with no minimum for the luring, and 14 days for the child pornography. The 
accused was sentenced to 60 days intermittent on the child pornography charge, and a 9 month 
conditional sentence on the luring charge. 
— R. v. Crant, 2017 ONCJ 192, [2017] O.J. No. 1493. 
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Indecent acts 
 
173 (1) Everyone who wilfully does an indecent act in a public place in the presence of 
one or more persons, or in any place with intent to insult or offend any person, 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not 
more than two years; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than six months. 
 
Exposure 
(2) Every person who, in any place, for a sexual purpose, exposes his or her genital 
organs to a person who is under the age of 16 years 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not 
more than two years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 
90 days; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than six months and to a minimum 
punishment of imprisonment for a term of 30 days. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 173; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 7; 2008, c. 6, s. 54; 2010, c. 17, 
s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 23. 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — s. 173(1) — “Indecent act” and “public place” is defined in s. 150 of the 
Criminal Code. “Public place” should be understood as any place to which the public have 
physical, as opposed to simply visual, access.1 An indecent act does not require a sexual 
context; instead, it should be assessed on the community standard of tolerance test.2 This 
offence is made out when either: (i) the accused wilfully does an indecent act in a public place in 
the presence of one or more persons other than the accused; or (ii) the accused does an 
indecent act in any place with a specific intent to insult or offend any person. Regarding (i), 
there is conflicting jurisprudence as to whether “wilfully” applies merely to the indecent act, or 
also to the requirement that the act be done in a public place in the presence of one or more 
people.3 That an unmonitored video camera observes the acts, or another person was involved 
in the act, does not satisfy the requirement that the act was performed in the presence of one or 
more persons.4 
— 1R. v. Clark, 2005 SCC 2, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 6. 
— 2R. v. Jacob, [1996] 31 O.R. (3d) 350, 142 DLR (4th) 411 (ONCA). 
— 3R. v. Sloan, [1994] 18 O.R. (3d) 143, 70 O.A.C. 357 (ONCA), (Galligan J.A. finding 
willfulness applies to both elements, Osborne J.A. finding that it applies only to the 
commission or performance of the act, and Goodman J.A. taking no position on this 
issue); R. c. Mailhot (1996), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 376, 31 W.C.B. (2d) 466 (QCCA), (preferring 
the position of Galligan J.A. in Sloan that both the act, and its being done in the presence 
of another, must be willful). 
— 4R. v. Follett (1994), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 435, 24 W.C.B. (2d) 456 (NLSC), affd in R. v. Follett 
(1995), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 493, 27 W.C.B. (2d) 413 (NLCA). 
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Essential elements — s. 173(2) — “Indecent act” is defined in s. 150 of the Criminal Code. 
Mere nudity, without a degree of “moral turpitude”, will not suffice.1 “In any place” refers to the 
location where the accused exposes himself; there is no requirement the accused and victim be 
in the same place when the offence is committed. As such, this section applies to images sent 
over the Internet.2 
— 1R. v. Beaupre (1971), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 320, [1971] B.C.J. No. 607, para. 6 (BCSC). 
— 2R. v. Alicandro, 2009 ONCA 133, 95 O.R. (3d) 173, leave to appeal refused [2009] 
S.C.C.A. No. 395. 
 
Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of the complainant is no defence to, 
among others, an offence under s. 173(2). This limitation is not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.1 
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA). 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Exposure of genitals for sexual purpose to a person under 16 years of age via Facebook 
— On the facts, the accused was acquitted of this offence because the Crown failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the “penis picture” allegedly sent by the accused via Facebook 
was of his genital organs. “If the accused sent pictures of someone else's penis he would not 
have violated the section” (para. 199). 
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302. 
 
Constitutionality of retrospective application of s. 161(1) amendments — The 2012 s. 
161(1) amendments empower sentencing judges to prohibit sexual offenders from having any 
contact with a person under 16 years of age (s. 161.1(1)(c)), or from using the Internet or other 
digital networks (s. 161(1)(d)). The Supreme Court found that these amendments constitute 
punishment, and thus retrospectively applying them violates s. 11 of the Charter. Retrospective 
application of the s. 161(1)(c) contact provision fails the cost-benefit stage of the Oakes test, but 
retrospective application of the s. 161(1)(d) internet prohibition is saved by s. 1. Section 
161(1)(d) is directed at “grave, emerging harms precipitated by a rapidly evolving social and 
technological context”. Furthermore, an “Internet prohibition, while invasive, is not among the 
most onerous punishments, such as increased incarceration” (para. 114).  
— R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906. 
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Criminal harassment 
 
264 (1) No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another person is 
harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is harassed, engage in conduct 
referred to in subsection (2) that causes that other person reasonably, in all the 
circumstances, to fear for their safety or the safety of anyone known to them. 
 
Prohibited conduct 
(2) The conduct mentioned in subsection (1) consists of 
(a) repeatedly following from place to place the other person or anyone known to 
them; 
(b) repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly, the other person or 
anyone known to them; 
(c) besetting or watching the dwelling-house, or place where the other person, or 
anyone known to them, resides, works, carries on business or happens to be; or 
(d) engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person or any member of 
their family. 
 
Punishment 
(3) Every person who contravenes this section is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
 
Factors to be considered 
(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this section, the court imposing the 
sentence on the person shall consider as an aggravating factor that, at the time the 
offence was committed, the person contravened 
(a) the terms or conditions of an order made pursuant to section 161 or a 
recognizance entered into pursuant to section 810, 810.1 or 810.2; or 
(b) the terms or conditions of any other order or recognizance made or entered into 
under the common law or a provision of this or any other Act of Parliament or of a 
province that is similar in effect to an order or recognizance referred to in 
paragraph (a). 
 
Reasons 
(5) Where the court is satisfied of the existence of an aggravating factor referred to in 
subsection (4), but decides not to give effect to it for sentencing purposes, the court 
shall give reasons for its decision. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 264; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 37; 1993, c. 45, s. 2; 1997, c. 16, 
s. 4, c. 17, s. 9; 2002, c. 13, s. 10. 
 
* * * * * 
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General case law 
 
Essential elements — The elements of the actus reus are: 1) the accused engaged in conduct 
prohibited by s. 264(2)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Code; 2) the complainant was harassed; 3) the 
prohibited conduct caused the complainant to fear for their or another’s safety; and 4) the 
complainant’s fear was reasonable. The mens rea is knowledge of, wilful blindness, or 
recklessness as to whether the complainant was harassed.1 “Repeatedly” under s. 264(2)(a) 
and (b) means more than once,2 but not necessarily more than twice.3 A charge under s. 
264(1)(d) can be supported based on a single incident, unlike ss. 264(1)(a) and (b).4 An 
accused’s conduct may be contrary to s. 264(2)(d) without spoken words.5 The Kienapple 
principle may preclude multiple convictions for criminal harassment and uttering threats.6 
— 1R. v. Sillipp, 1997 ABCA 346, 209 A.R. 253; R. v. Kosikar, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 238, 138 
C.C.C. (3d) (ONCA); R. c. Lamontagne, 129 C.C.C. (3d) 181, 39 W.C.B. (2d) 546 (QCCA); R. 
v. Sanchez, 2012 BCCA 469, 99 C.R. (6th) 180. 
— 2R. v. Ryback, 71 B.C.A.C. 175, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 240 (BCCA). 
— 3R. v. Ohenhen, 77 O.R. (3d) 570, 200 C.C.C. (3d) 309 (ONCA). 
— 4R. v. Kosikar (1999), 178 D.L.R. (4th) 238, 138 C.C.C. (3d) (ONCA), para. 15-17; R. v. 
Hawkins, 2006 BCCA 498, 233 B.C.A.C. 7, at para. 19-20. 
— 5R. v. Kohl (2009), 94 O.R. (3d) 241, 241 CCC (3d) 284 (ONCA). 
— 6R. v. Hawkins, 2006 BCCA 498, 233 B.C.A.C. 7. 
 
Defining harassment — To prove harassment, it is not sufficient that the complainant was 
annoyed or disquieted; instead, the complainant must have felt “tormented, troubled, worried 
continually or chronically, plagued, bedeviled and badgered”.1 These words do not replace the 
word “harassed” in the Code, nor is it necessary that a complainant experience all of these 
feelings cumulatively to be harassed.2 Harassment is not restricted to its “classical” sense of 
repeated minor attacks, and can include bothering the complainant with repeated demands, 
solicitations, or incitements. Harassment can be bothersome by reason principally of its 
continuity or repetitive nature.3  
— 1R. v. Kosikar, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 238, 138 C.C.C. (3d) 217 (ONCA), paras. 24-5. 
— 2R. v. Kordrostami, 47 O.R. (3d) 788, 143 C.C.C. (3d) 488 (ONCA). 
— 3R. c. Lamontagne, 129 C.C.C. (3d) 181, 39 W.C.B. (2d) 546 (ONCA), para. 28. 
 
Charter concerns — Assuming the provisions of s. 264 infringe the right to freedom of 
expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter, the infringement is justified by s. 1 of the 
Charter. S. 264 also does not violate s. 7 of the Charter for being impermissibly vague, or 
allowing the morally innocent to be punished.  
— 1R. v. Sillipp, 1997 ABCA 346, 209 A.R. 253; R. v. Krushel (2000), 130 O.A.C. 160, 142 
C.C.C. (3d) 1 (ONCA). 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
  
Definition of “Doxing” —“Doxing” involves publishing on the Internet identifiable personal 
information about an individual that has usually been obtained from social media sites and from 
hacking into private systems. Depending on the nature of the information, its disclosure can 
cause the victim distress, fear, embarrassment and shame. The personal information can be 
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used by others to facilitate identity theft and fraud. The threat to publish private information can 
also be used by the person who holds the information for extortion and blackmail purposes.”  
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 3. 
 
Definition of “Swatting” —“Swatting involves tricking an emergency service agency into 
dispatching an emergency response based on a false report of an ongoing critical incident. 
Swatting can lead to the deployment of a range of emergency response teams including police, 
fire and bomb squads and the evacuation of businesses, schools or other public institutions.”  
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 4. 
 
Not objectively reasonable — Blocking on social media, in this case twitter, may not be 
enough to convey that an individual has been harassed. 
— R v. Elliott, 2016 ONCJ 35. 
 
Not objectively reasonable — The accused continuously sent threatening messages via 
Facebook and text message. The accused’s claim that the complainant’s subjective feeling of 
harassment resulted from a misinterpretation of the Facebook message was not credible. 
— R. v. Richner, 2017 QCCQ 3095. 
 
Not objectively reasonable — Accused posted various threatening materials against the 
complaint (his ex-wife) on Facebook. Court found that none of the material can be considered 
threatening in themselves. Given that the accused also blocked the complainant, the court held 
that there could be no harassment until the complainant decided to use another person’s 
account to view the accused’s profile.  
— R. v. Corby, 2012 BCPC 561. 
 
Not objectively reasonable — Accused commented “Good get the bitch out of there before I 
bomb her” when she tweeted a CTV article “Pauline Marois ready to call an election” (para 2). 
Accused acquitted of criminal harassment as the Crown failed to establish that then Premier of 
Quebec feared for her safety or anyone known to her. 
— R. v. Le Seelleur, 2014 QCCQ 12216. 
 
Not objectively reasonable — Accused asked complainant twice over Facebook to show him 
her breasts, allegedly sent her pornographic pictures over email, and stared at her chest during 
family gatherings. Complainant blocked him on Facebook and deleted him from MSN. Court 
neither found complainant credible nor found that such fear would have been reasonable.  
— R. v. Doyle, 2009 NSPC 56. 
 
Objectively reasonable — The accused was convicted of criminal harassment due to emails, 
text messages, and Facebook messages sent to the complainant. Just a smiley face, the court 
found, can trigger objectively reasonable paranoia regarding “how far the accused was willing to 
go” (para 18). 
— R. v. Alotaibi (2013), OJ No 2473, 109 WCB (2d) 111. 
 
Objectively reasonable — Accused sent numerous Facebook messages from his personal 
account and two other fake accounts. The court accepted that it was the Accused sending 
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messages from the fake accounts, given the consistency of tenor and content. Complainant’s 
threat found to be reasonable, in part, because one message was read as a threat.   
— R. v. Amiri, [2015] O.J. No. 5256. 
 
Objectively reasonable — In granting the Crown’s application for witness accommodation, the 
court accepted that the Crown’s argument “that the circumstances surrounding the alleged 
offence, being through a communication by way of Facebook, are supportive of the view that 
direct confrontation of the witness by the accused in the courtroom will cause the witness 
unacceptable stress and anxiety” (para. 16) 
— R. v. O’Hare, 2017 BCPC 118. 
 
Objectively reasonable — Accused sent SnapChat messages threatening to shoot up two 
schools. The few students who received personal messages of “RIP” also felt especially 
threatened (para 7). Two schools had to take additional security measures and parents feared 
for their children’s lives. The principal of Eastdale Collegiate also claimed in his Victim Impact 
Statement that “students are afraid to come to school, have lost instructional time, and have 
required counselling” (para 23). 
— R. v. Richardson, [2018] O.J. No 1452. 
 
Objectively reasonable — RM and SH (motorcyclists) were harassed through social media/ 
email/ in-person by Mr. James, who is a member of the Bacchus Motorcycle Club. James, for 
instance, sent the following Facebook message to RM when he was out-of-town: “will see you 
as soon as you get back. Don’t waste your dollars on any souvenirs” (para 37). Judge claimed 
that: “I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, looking at all the circumstances, Mr. James 
was effectively saying to RM: “you, and your family, are at risk of suffering serious bodily harm” 
(para 177).  
— R. v. Howe, [2018] N.S.J. No. 281. 
 
Objectively reasonable — Hirsch posted a nude photo of his ex-girlfriend and uttered a threat 
along with the photo, namely that he would choke his ex-girlfriend and end it with a shotgun 
shell. Accused sentenced to 6-months incarceration and 12 months probation; sentence upheld 
on appeal. 
— R. v. Hirsch, [2017] S.J. No. 59, 2017 SKCA 14. 
 
Objectively reasonable — Ernest Stewart began messaging his ex-girlfriend and her current 
partner. After Stewart was blocked, he hacked his ex-girlfriend’s Facebook account and sent the 
following messages to the victim’s current partner: “don't be coming around because Ernest will 
be anal with his actions like Texas Chainsaw” (para 3). He also messaged, I hope somebody 
don't fall over the wharf and crack their skull, I've seen it before, Accidents Happen” (para 3). 
Judge sentenced Stewart to an adjusted global sentence of 30 months which included 6 months 
for criminal harassment. 
— R. v. Stewart, [2018] N.J. No. 76. 
 
Objectively reasonable — Accused repeatedly harassed victim on social media (namely 
Facebook), thereby causing victim to reasonably fear for her safety. One of the messages, for 
instance, claimed: “Tell your mom that if she doesn't fucking straighten out, she will be fucking 
drug (sic) behind a truck" (para 54). 
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— R. v. Lauck, [2018] A.J. No. 1312. 
 
Objectively reasonable — Mr. R separated from his wife, Ms. R. Mr. R concluded that his wife 
had an affair with Mr. A. In response, Mr. R messaged Mr. A’s wife (Ms. A), informing her of the 
affair and threatening to harm her husband. Many acts of harassment were ensued against Ms. 
R and Mr. A, including on Twitter, e-mail, Google Review, and voicemail.  
— R. v. J.R., [2018] O.J. No. 6409. 
 
Evidence — Section 8 of the Charter was not breached by the police (1) receiving emails from 
[the accused’s email address] directed to the email address created by the police; (2) obtaining 
screen captures of emails allegedly composed by the accused; or (3) obtaining subscriber 
information from Shaw Communications relating to the I.P. address of the emails received by 
the police. Consequently, the screen captures, all the email transactions in question, and the 
PIPEDA requests and responses were admitted into evidence. 
— R v Labrentz, 2010 ABPC 11. 
 
Evidence — Proof of the Tweets sent by the accused and their content comprise the entire 
case on the act of repeated communications. The detective used the Sysomos software to 
obtain electronic records of the tweets, part of which is not available on the public platform. 
Court found there is sufficient corroborating evidence proving the accused sent the tweets and 
no reason to question the reliability of the Sysomos software used.  
— R. v. Elliott, 2016 ONCJ 35. 
 
Evidence — The accused was convicted of criminal harassment, in part due to a large number 
of Facebook messages sent from his personal account and two other fake Facebook accounts. 
The court accepted that the accused sent the Facebook messages from the fake Facebook 
accounts, given the consistency of tenor and content of these messages with the accused’s text 
messages and in-person interactions with the complainant.  
— R. v. Amiri, [2015] O.J. No. 5256. 
 
Sentencing — Aggravating factors were the serious impacts that the social media posts had on 
the communities: Two schools had to go on shut down as a result of the accused’s posts 
threatening to shoot down the school. Another aggravating factor is that the student was warned 
when he was 16 for similar posts and was offered counselling, but he declined.  
— R. v. Richardson, [2018] O.J. No 1452. 
 
Sentencing — Abusing/ assaulting a (common law) partner was an aggravating factor as per 
section 718.2(a)(ii). The fact that accused did not post the video of the victim having sexual 
intercourse with another man, but only sent it to the victim’s friend, decreased the seriousness 
of the crime. 
— R. v. Greene, [2018] N.J. No. 95. 
 
Sentencing — The court held that general deterrence and denunciation are primary 
considerations when individuals use social media to criminally harass others. “It is imperative 
that the community at large get the message that using social media to criminally harass 
another person will not be tolerated and that serious repercussions will ensue for those who 
engage in it” (para 27). 
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— R. v. Gardner, [2018] N.J. No. 243. 
 
Sentencing — The accused, a talented young pianist, posted his ex-girlfriend’s nude photos on 
a pornographic website without her consent. He was charged with criminal harassment and pled 
guilty. Court noted his excellent antecedent record and high rehabilitation potential, but refused 
to exercise its discharge discretion under s. 730(1), stating the best interest of the accused is 
outweighed by the sentencing objectives of denunciation and general deterrence “given the 
affront to the high value society places on human dignity and privacy within the context of close 
intimate relationships.” (para. 28). A 12-month non-reporting probation was imposed.  
— R. v. B.Z. (Zhou), 2016 ONCJ 547. 
 
Sentencing (Prohibition on Social Media Use) — Court found the accused’s conduct had a 
life-changing and serious effect on the victim and her family, and that the accused had little 
appreciation for the impact of his conduct. In sentencing him to 18 months incarceration 
additional to the 5-months spent in pre-trial detention, the Court imposed a 3-year probation 
order, which included a prohibition from accessing the internet and not being in possession of 
any electronic device with capacity to access to the internet. 
— R. v. Cholin, 2010 BCPC 417. 
 
Sentencing (Prohibition on Social Media Use) — The accused (a youth) sent a number of 
threatening Facebook messages to his ex-girlfriend, in the context of other abusive and criminal 
conduct. Court found his behaviour exhibited a “complete breakdown in respect for others”, 
particularly the three victims (para. 57). The sentence was a 6-month deferred custody and 
supervision order and a 15-month probation, under the conditions that the accused immediately 
delete his social media accounts. 
— R. v. C.L., 2014 NSPC 79. 
 
Sentencing (Review Board) — Layne and & Deneeka were involved in an intimate 
relationship, Daneeka no longer wanted contact. Layne nonetheless contacted Deneeka by 
phone, text message, and Facebook. Layne’s current diagnosis is schizophrenia and cannbis 
abuse disorder. Review board concluded that Layne continued to pose a significant threat to the 
safety of the community, and he received a conditional discharge disposition, subject to 
conditions, including he not cohabit with Daneeka.  
— Layne (Re) (2018), O.R.B.D. No. 1211. 
 
Sentencing (Review Board) — The board, in agreement with the hospital, agreed “that a 
detention order is both necessary and appropriate at this early stage of Ms. Fournier’s treatment 
and rehabilitation (para 21). Review board found Ms. Fournier’s threats against a Crown 
attorney, which she posted on Facebook, was due to her delusions, which have been ongoing 
for 18 years. 
— Fournier (Re) (2018), O.R.B.D. No. 53. 
 
Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — The accused, diagnosed with Asperger's 
Disorder, was found NCR on account of mental disorder on two counts of criminal harassment 
in 2013. He has since been detained at the hospital. 
— Baynham-McColl (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 120. 
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Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Accused found Not Criminally Responsible 
after repeated interactions on Facebook and other mediums with victim. Accused diagnosed 
with a delusional disorder. The court did not make a Disposition but deferred the matter to the 
Ontario Review Board. “Board satisfied that that Mr. McCormick poses a risk of serious physical 
or psychological harm to members of the public and should be subject to a detention 
Disposition.” (para 40). 
— McCormick (Re) (2018), O.R.B.D. No. 2970. 
 
Not criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Teresa Lidguerre was found NCR on charges 
of uttering death threats against PM Justin Trudeau and uttering death threats against 
unspecified persons and PM Justin Trudeau. Under s. 672.47, the court did not make a 
disposition but remanded the accused to the Ontario Review Board. Given Ms. Lidguerre’s 
severe mental illness of schizophrenia, her reintegration into society and other needs, as well as 
the paramount consideration of public safety, the Board issued a detention order under s. 
672.54. 
— Lidguerre (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 630, 2017 CarswellOnt 4315. 
 
Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Carpio was found NCR on charges of criminal 
harassment, uttering threats, and breach of recognizance, and was made subject to the 
dispositions of the Ontario Review Board. He was diagnosed as psychotic disorder NOS with at 
least three years of history and potential to relapse into substance abuse. Accordingly, the 
Board found he has met the test for significant risk and should continue to be detained. 
— Carpio (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 27, 2017 CarswellOnt 105. 
 
Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Mr. Jain was found NCR on four charges of 
uttering death threat and was detained at a health care facility. Since primary school, he has 
been struggling with mental illness (diagnosed Bipolar I Disorder) and later substance abuse. A 
conditional discharge was granted. 
— Jain (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 356, 2017 CarswellOnt 2830. 
 
Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Mr. Im was found NCR on charges of criminal 
harassment, uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm, and failure to comply with probation 
order. The Court did not make a disposition. The Board found his Schizophrenia and residual 
psychotic symptoms continue to pose a threat and ordered detention at a treatment facility. 
— Im (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 287, 2017 CarswellOnt 2607. 
 
Charter considerations — The accused was sentenced to 1yr imprisonment followed by 2yr 
probation for posting photos of his 16-year-old ex-girlfriend on the internet. He challenged the 
constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of 1yr prescribed by s. 163.1(3) for 
violating s. 12 of the Charter. Court found the section does not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment – deterrence & denunciation were primary objectives when case involves abuse of 
a minor (para 85). 
— R. v. Shultz, 2008 ABQB 679. 
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Uttering threats 
 
264.1 (1) Every one commits an offence who, in any manner, knowingly utters, conveys 
or causes any person to receive a threat 
(a) to cause death or bodily harm to any person; 
(b) to burn, destroy or damage real or personal property; or 
(c) to kill, poison or injure an animal or bird that is the property of any person. 
 
Punishment 
(2) Every one who commits an offence under paragraph (1)(a) is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five 
years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding eighteen months. 
 
Idem 
(3) Every one who commits an offence under paragraph (1)(b) or (c) 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 38; 1994, c. 44, s. 16. 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — actus reus — The actus reus of this offence is uttering, conveying, or 
otherwise causing any person to receive a threat of death or serious bodily harm. Whether a 
statement constitutes a threat is a question of law, assessed on an objective standard, with 
regards to the particular context in which the statement is communicated.1 The Crown does not 
need to prove the intended recipient was intimidated by the threat, or even aware of the threat. 
It is also unnecessary for the threat to be directed towards a specific person; a threat towards a 
particular group is sufficient.2 
— 1R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 931. 
— 2R. c. Rémy, [1993] R.J.Q. 1383, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 176 (QCCA). 
 
Essential elements — mens rea — The mens rea of this offence is intent to have the threat 
intimidate, or to be taken seriously. This fault element is disjunctive. While this is a subjective 
standard, the court will often have to draw inferences from the words and circumstances to 
determine whether the requisite mens rea was present.1 The accused need not have intended 
to convey the threat to the intended victim of the threat, or to carry out the threat.2 It is sufficient 
the accused intended that those to whom the words were spoken take the threat seriously.3 
— 1R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 931. 
— 2R. v. Tibando (1994), 69 O.A.C. 225, 88 C.C.C. (3d) 229 (ONCA), para. 2. 
— 3R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 931, para. 17, citing R. v. Clemente, [1994] 2 
S.C.R. 758, [1994] S.C.J. No. 50. 
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Charter concerns — S. 264.1 infringes the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by s. 
2(b) of the Charter, but is saved by s. 1 of the Charter. 
— R. v. Clemente (1993), 92 Man.R. (2d) 51, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 398 (MBCA), aff’d in R. v. 
Clemente, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 758, 95 Man.R. (2d) 161. 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Uttering threats on Twitter — A 19-year old accused posted a link on Twitter to a CTV article 
entitled "Pauline Marois ready to call an election", with her own comment: "Good get the bitch 
out of there before I bomb her”. Despite the accused’s regret, remorse and cooperation with the 
police after being confronted by them about the tweet, she was angry and frustrated at the 
moment she made this tweet and had the requisite intention to be taken seriously. She was 
convicted of uttering threats. However, she was acquitted of criminal harassment (see above). 
— R. v. Le Seelleur, 2014 QCCQ 12216, 2015EXP-309. 
 
Uttering threats on Facebook — Through Facebook, the accused described to the 
complainant his sexual fantasies, which included physically harming her in violent ways. Upon 
arrest, the accused was found in possession of a hand-written note stating the accused could 
only get sexual pleasure “if the female was undergoing extreme pain, being raped, abused, 
tortured, or was [...] crying”. When establishing the intent behind the Facebook messages, the 
court noted the accused’s incriminating words. Furthermore, given the brevity of relationship 
between the parties, it was reasonable to conclude the accused’s Facebook messages were 
serious when they conveyed he did not care if she consented to being harmed.   
— R. v. D.D., 2013 ONCJ 134, 105 W.C.B. (2d) 345. 
 
Uttering threats on Facebook — The accused had previously posted images of swastikas, a 
single reference to the Virginia Tech massacre, and anti-Semitic comments on his Facebook 
profile. The police cautioned him about these posts, but no charges were laid. About a month 
later, the accused posted a status update on his profile reading: “I’m wearing black and I’m 
riding black this time around…I’m bringing death with me this time around.” The court noted that 
the format of a Facebook status update “diminishes the seriousness” of these words (para. 9). 
After considering the accused’s habit of posting hourly Facebook updates on what he was 
doing, political opinions, and biblical references, the court concluded there was a reasonable 
doubt as to whether the accused intended his status update as a death threat.   
— R. v. Lee, 2010 ONCJ 291, 89 W.C.B. (2d) 209. 
 
Uttering threats on Facebook — The accused posted a number of Facebook statuses that, 
“[v]iewed objectively…would convey a threat of serious bodily harm” (para. 7). However, the 
court concluded the accused did not mean to intimidate, because people use Facebook to 
construct an alternate persona, the postings were mere expressions of emotions directed 
towards those who might be sympathetic to the accused’s anger at losing his son, the accused 
had numerous contacts with the apparent targets of his threats, yet did not do anything, and the 
accused testified he posted these items to blow off steam, as he was taught in a prior anger 
management course.  
— R. v. Sather, 2008 ONCJ 98, 78 W.C.B. (2d) 285. 
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Uttering threats on Facebook — The accused posted a number of statuses on Facebook 
advocating for the death of political figures, including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Alberta 
Premier Rachel Notley. The accused had previously been warned by police that threats to kill or 
cause bodily harm “cross the line” of s. 264.1 of the Criminal Code. This case was distinguished 
from R. v. Sather (above) on the basis that the accused in this case did not adduce any 
evidence that his comments were part of an attempt to create an alternate persona, or intended 
simply as an attempt to blow off steam. 
— R. v. Hayes, 2017 SKPC 8, [2017] S.J. No. 40. 
 
Uttering threats on Facebook — The accused was acquitted on an Uttering Threats charge 
based on a reasonable doubt about whether the accused intended to intimidate or be feared, 
given that the accused’s statements were phrased in an apparently facetious or absurd manner, 
despite their hateful content. (See, however, entry for R. c. Rioux under s. 319, inciting hatred.) 
— R. c. Rioux, 2016 QCCQ 6762, 2016EXP-2527, unofficial English translation available at 
2016 CarswellQue 13004. 
 
Uttering threats on Facebook — Consideration of accused’s explanation of comments — 
The accused successfully appealed convictions for uttering threats and s. 464 counselling the 
commission of an indictable offence (murder) on the basis that the trial judge failed to consider 
the explanations that the accused offered for comments he had posted on Facebook, as well as 
the fact that the accused deleted the comments once he realized they were attracting 
controversy. The court rejected the Crown’s claim that the accused’s clarification, that he meant 
to call for the death of particular individuals only after lawful trials in a jurisdiction that retains the 
death penalty, went to motive and not to intention. The explanations offered were found to go 
beyond motive, and to provide context for the interpretation of the accused’s comments. 
— Joad c. R., 2016 QCCA 1940, 136 W.C.B. (2d) 231. 
 
Uttering threats – Admissibility of Facebook evidence – The accused was charged with one 
count of assault causing bodily harm and one count of uttering a threat to cause death or bodily 
harm to the complainant, his wife. On the alleged date of the offence, the accused and the 
complainant were in their home. The complainant sent Facebook messages to her landlady 
indicating that an assault had occurred and that she needed help. The court assessed the 
admissibility of the Facebook hearsay evidence using the framework from R v Bradshaw, [2017] 
SCJ No 35 (SCC). Under this framework, the court was satisfied that the corroborative evidence 
ruled out the alternative explanations such that the only remaining explanation for the statement 
was the accuracy of its material aspects, and substantive reliability of the hearsay evidence was 
established. 
— R. v. ASG, 2019 BCPC 5, 2019 CarswellBC 78 
 
Authentication of Facebook evidence —The accused appealed a conviction for uttering 
threats based on, among other grounds, the failure of the trial judge to consider s. 31.1 of the 
Canada Evidence Act (CEA), or to adequately authenticate evidence consisting of a screenshot 
alleged to depict a Facebook post by the accused. The appeal was rejected. S. 31.1 CEA was 
explained as simply a codification of the common-law rules of authentication, and the Crown 
was found to have sufficiently authenticated the documents by putting them to the complainant 
on direct examination. As to the integrity of the documents, although the screenshot had been 
provided by a friend of the complainant, the trial judge adequately addressed the issue of 
integrity by identifying pieces of evidence that led to the conclusion that it would be speculative 
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to conclude that anyone but the accused had authored the messages. 
— R. v. Hirsch, 2017 SKCA 14, [2017] S.J. No. 59. 
 
Limits on the Charter right to freedom of expression — After posting on Facebook a general 
threat to women, the accused was charged with uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm 
to all women. The self-represented accused petitioned, amongst other things, that what was 
posted on Facebook was protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter, and was thus inadmissible as 
evidence. The court disagreed, because s. 1 of the Charter allows reasonable limits — such as 
s. 264 of the Criminal Code — on s. 2(b) rights.  
— R. v. Hunt, 2012 QCCQ 4688, 2012EXP-2784. 
 
Sentencing for terrorist threat on Twitter — The accused communicated via Twitter with 
Islamic extremists and supporters of ISIS, culminating in his writing “Give me Canadian 
addresses. I will ensure something happens.” He pled guilty to uttering threats for this 
statement. Given the circumstances of the accused, that he had few followers on Twitter, that 
he did not actually intend to engage in terrorist activity, and that the offence was essentially a 
nuisance to law enforcement, on appeal his sentence of one-year imprisonment was found to 
have unduly emphasized deterrence and denunciation such that it was reduced to six months 
imprisonment.   
— R. v. Boissoneau, 2016 ONSC 820, 128 W.C.B. (2d) 399. 
 
Sentencing for uttering threats — The accused pled guilty to, among other things, uttering a 
threat on Facebook to burn property. The accused was sentenced to three months’ 
incarceration, and a twelve-month probation period to follow. Probation conditions included 
prohibitions on communicating, including by Facebook, with victims of his threats. 
— R. v. Saunders, 2013 CanLII 75485, 343 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 271 (NLPC). 
 
Sentencing for uttering threats — The accused was convicted of knowingly uttering a threat 
to cause death by electronic messaging; specifically, the accused used Snapchat to threaten to 
commit school shootings. The accused was 18 years old at the time of sentencing and was a 
first offender. The court considered it an aggravating factor that the accused had engaged in 
similar online threats in the past, at which time the police had not charged him but had 
cautioned and advised him of the illegality of his actions. Accordingly, the court did not accept 
that the accused did not understand the seriousness of Snapchat threats. Balancing the 
sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation with those of restraint, rehabilitation and 
reintegration back into the community, the court determined that a suspended sentence with 
three years’ probation would be appropriate and just. 
— R v Richardson, 2018 ONCJ 171, 2018 CarswellOnt 4301 
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Sexual assault 
 
265 (1) A person commits an assault when 
(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that 
other person, directly or indirectly; 
(b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or a gesture, to apply force to another 
person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe on reasonable 
grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or 
(c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts 
or impedes another person or begs. 
 
Application 
(2) This section applies to all forms of assault, including sexual assault, sexual assault 
with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm and aggravated sexual 
assault. 
 
Consent 
(3) For the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained where the complainant 
submits or does not resist by reason of 
(a) the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the 
complainant; 
(b) threats or fear of the application of force to the complainant or to a person other 
than the complainant; 
(c) fraud; or 
(d) the exercise of authority. 
 
Accused’s belief as to consent 
(4) Where an accused alleges that he believed that the complainant consented to the 
conduct that is the subject-matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that there is 
sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence would constitute a 
defence, shall instruct the jury, when reviewing all the evidence relating to the 
determination of the honesty of the accused’s belief, to consider the presence or 
absence of reasonable grounds for that belief. 
 
R.S., c. C-34, s. 244; 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 21; 1980-81-82-83, c. 125, s. 19. 
 
* * * * * 
 
271 Everyone who commits a sexual assault is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 
years or, if the complainant is under the age of 16 years, to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for 
a term of one year; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than 18 months or, if the complainant is under the age of 16 
years, to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a 
minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months. 
 
R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 10; 1994, c. 44, s. 19; 2012, c. 1, s. 25; 2015, c. 23, s. 14 
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* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — The actus reus of this offence contains three elements: 1) touching; 2) 
the sexual nature of the contact; and 3) the absence of consent. The first two elements are 
objective, and it is sufficient that the accused’s actions were voluntary even absent mens rea 
with respect to the sexual nature of his behaviour. The third element is subjective, determined 
by reference to the complainant’s subjective internal state of mind towards the touching at the 
time it occurred. The mens rea of this offence contains two elements: 1) intention to touch, and 
2) knowing of, or being reckless or wilfully blind to, a lack of consent on the part of the person 
touched. The accused may deny the requisite mens rea by asserting an honest but mistaken 
belief in consent; the common law and Criminal Code provisions in ss. 273.1(2) and 273.2 limit 
this defence. 
— R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 169 DLR (4th) 193. 
 
Assessing the sexual nature of contact — Determining whether the impugned conduct has 
the requisite sexual nature is an objective inquiry. Factors to consider are “the part of the body 
touched, the nature of the contact, the situation in which it occurred, the words and gestures 
accompanying the act, and all other circumstances surrounding the conduct, including threats 
which may or may not be accompanied by force”. Desire for sexual gratification or other motives 
may also be a factor, but it is simply one of many factors to be considered.1 In fact, it has been 
held that since sexual assault is an act of power, aggression and control, “sexual gratification, if 
present, is at best a footnote.”2 
— 1R. v. Chase, [1987] 2 SCR 293, 45 DLR (4th) 98, para. 11. 
— 2R. v. K.B.V. (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 20, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (ONCA), para. 10. 
 
Evidentiary issues — S. 276 restricts the purposes to which evidence of the complainant’s 
past sexual activity can be put. These restrictions, along with the accompanying procedures in 
ss. 276.1-276.5 do not violate ss. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.1 Sections 278.1-278.91 set out a 
procedure by which the defence can apply for the disclosure of records in which the 
complainant has a privacy interest. These sections are a response to the common-law system 
devised in R. v. O’Connor.2 This procedure is Charter-compliant.3 
— 1R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, S.C.J. No. 46, para. 22. 
— 2R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, S.C.J. No. 98. 
— 3R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, S.C.J. No. 68. 
 
Consent — “The sexual activity in question” — S. 273.1 defines “consent”, and prescribes 
situations where consent is not obtained. It can either be proven that the complainant did not 
agree to the touching, its sexual nature, or the identity of the accused, or, if those factors are not 
established, that there were factors that would operate to vitiate the complainant’s apparent 
consent. The “sexual activity in question” is defined by the touching, its sexual nature, and the 
identity of the accused only, and does not incorporate factors such as condom use or STI 
status. These factors should instead be considered as part of fraud vitiating consent.1 Prior 
consent does not remain operative at future times, particularly where a complainant becomes 
unconscious.2 
— 1 R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19,  1 SCR 346. 
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— 2 R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28, 2 SCR 440; R. v. Ashlee, 2006 ABCA 244, 61 Alta. L.R. (4th) 
226, leave to appeal refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 415. 
 
Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of a complainant under the age of 
16 is no defence to, among others, an offence under s. 271. This limitation is not a violation of s. 
7 of the Charter.1 
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA). 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence — The court ruled screenshots of a 
Facebook conversation between the accused and victim constituted an “electronic document” 
under s. 31.8 of the Canada Evidence Act. The victim’s testimony of how Facebook works — in 
addition to the lack of evidence presented to doubt the integrity of the screenshots — was 
sufficient for the court to determine the screenshots were admissible as electronic documents. 
The court also found the accused was the person chatting with the victim on Facebook. While 
the screenshots constituted hearsay evidence, they were admitted under an exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
— R. v. Soh, 2014 NBQB 20, 416 N.B.R. (2d) 328. 
 
Snapchat evidence used to bolster credibility — While in a car with the accused shortly 
before the assault took place, the complainant sent a Snapchat, depicting the accused and 
subtitled “I’m scared”, along with text messages, to her sister and another friend. At trial, the 
consistent description of this Snapchat message by witnesses was used to bolster the credibility 
of those witnesses, as well as that of the complainant. Although the Snapchat could only be 
described by witnesses at the time of trial, given the self-destructing nature of the medium, the 
text messages sent alongside were used to confirm a witness’ description of the timeline of 
events. 
— R. v. Qhasimy, 2017 ABPC 83, [2017] A.J. No. 398. 
 
Facebook evidence used to bolster credibility — Facebook messages between the accused 
and the complainant, along with text messages and messages sent via the Xbox Live gaming 
service, were used to bolster the complainant’s credibility, and to demonstrate the need for the 
accused to have made further inquiries into the complainant’s consent, given that the 
complainant had previously been very clear that she did not consent to penetrative sexual 
intercourse. 
— R. v. J.P., 2017 BCPC 71, [2017] B.C.J. No. 497. 
 
Facebook evidence used to impeach credibility — Facebook messages sent between the 
complainant and accused, and the complainant and a relative, were used to impeach the 
complainant’s credibility, resulting in an acquittal. 
— R. v. Norton, 2017 ONSC 1395, [2017] O.J. No. 1343. 
 
Facebook messages as evidence – accused denies identity in Facebook evidence – The 
accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of his 4-year-old daughter. 
The complainant’s mother, upon learning of the molestations, sought support from a family 
friend. This family friend’s daughter and the accused apparently engaged in Facebook 
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communication, in which the accused essentially admitted to molesting his daughter. The 
accused denied molesting his daughter, and also denied ever communicating with the family 
friend’s daughter on Facebook. On the facts, the court rejected the accused’s evidence, and 
concluded the accused was the author of the impugned Facebook messages. To believe 
someone other than the accused sent the Facebook messages would “strain credulity.” Further, 
“[t]he accused's denial of that damning piece of evidence entirely undermines his credibility on 
the central issues,” namely, his denial of the charged offences. The court found the accused 
guilty of all charges.  
— R. v. B.R., [2017] O.J. No. 3782, 2017 ONSC 4429, para 40, 54 
 
Admissibility of Facebook messages for the truth of their contents – The accused was 
charged with the sexual assault of “J”, a mutual friend of himself and his wife, “R”. At trial, R 
testified that she witnessed the accused and J engaging in consensual sex. However, in 
Facebook posts, R stated that J was unconscious and did not consent. The court determined 
that the Facebook posts had sufficient threshold reliability to be admitted as out-of-court 
statements, in part because R was available for cross-examination. 
— R. v. C.F.N., 2018 YKSC 19 
 
Instagram post as evidence of consent – The accused, who suffered from cerebral palsy and 
multiple mental illnesses, was charged with two counts of sexual assault of the complainant. 
The accused took the position that the sexual activity was consensual or, in the alternative, that 
he had a mistaken belief that the complainant consented. The accused and the complainant 
were both over the age of consent and had a relationship with sexual overtones at the time of 
the alleged offences. They often spoke about violent sex, rape fantasies, suicidal ideation, and 
the infliction of pain. Near the end of their relationship, the complainant posted a photo of herself 
on Instagram with the caption “it was consensual but consequential”. The accused submitted 
this Instagram post as evidence of the complainant’s consent. In the context of the relationship 
between the accused and the complainant, the court did not accept the complainant’s testimony 
that the post had nothing to do with the accused and was only wordplay. The court concluded 
that the Crown failed to establish lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further 
stated that if it had not determined the case on this basis, the court would have found that the 
accused had an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant consented. The accused was 
found not guilty. 
— R. v. Shepperd, 2018 ONCJ 692 
 
Temporary nature of Snapchat communications – The alleged offence occurred when the 
accused and the complainant met up on a Sunday night, but their text message conversation 
only referenced plans on Monday night. By “rational inference”, the court determined that the 
accused and the complainant must have discussed their Sunday night plans over Snapchat. 
The court also discussed the temporary nature of messages sent over Snapchat, and 
specifically that they are not retrievable by the court as they are not stored on a server. 
— R. v. Hamidi, [2018] OJ No 2788, para 19, 86 
 
Accused denies identity in Snapchat evidence – The accused was charged with sexual 
assault. The complainant provided a screenshot of a Snapchat conversation with someone who 
implicitly admitted to sexual intercourse with the complainant. The complainant testified that the 
interlocutor in the Snapchat conversation was the accused, while the accused denied it was 
him. On that facts, the judge was convinced that the interlocutor was indeed the accused; the 
accused’s denial eroded his credibility, while the Snapchat conversation as a whole bolstered 
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the complainant’s version of events. As such, the court found the accused guilty of sexual 
assault. 
— R. v. J.M., [2018] O.J. No. 188, 2018 ONSC 344 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The court noted the 
complainant lied about her age and her Facebook profile picture “shows a young person trying 
to seem significantly older than her 14 years” (para. 9). However, while the complainant may 
well have been manipulative, this was “[a]ll the more reason” the 40-year-old accused should 
have made more inquiries into the complainant’s age before having sex with her (para. 56). The 
court convicted the accused of sexual interference and sexual assault. 
— R. v. Beckford, 2016 ONSC 1066, 28 W.C.B. (2d) 298. 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —Though there was no 
evidence as to whether the accused had access to the complainant’s full Facebook profile, it 
was plausible that the accused saw the complainant’s fake age on Facebook. This was one of 
eight factors that led the court to conclude there was reasonable doubt as to whether the 
accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age. The court acquitted 
the accused of sexual assault and sexual interference. 
— R. v. Akinsuyi, 2016 ONSC 2103, 129 W.C.B. (2d) 515.  
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —The 17-year-old accused 
had a sexual relationship with the 12-year-old complainant. Among other things, the court found 
the complainant lied about her age and posted pictures of herself on Facebook designed to 
make her look sexually mature. The accused also immediately terminated their relationship after 
the complainant told him she was twelve. The court acquitted the accused of sexual assault and 
sexual interference.  
— R. v. R.R., 2014 ONCJ 96, 112 W.C.B. (2d) 302. 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The complainant listed her 
age as 16 on Facebook, when she was in fact 12. The court noted it was common for youth to 
lie about their age to gain access to Facebook, thus the complainant’s behavior was not 
“particularly probative of dishonesty” (para. 47). On the facts, the court found the accused did 
not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age, and thus convicted him of 
sexual assault (and directed a conditional stay of proceedings on the sexual interference 
charge).  
— R. v. Z.I.D., 2012 BCPC 570, [2012] B.C.J. No. 3079. 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —The court accepted the 
accused honestly believed the complainant was at least 16 or 17, in part due to the 
complainant’s listed age on Facebook, and the “general tenor of her website pages…[as] trying 
to portray herself as someone much older than thirteen” (para. 22). Other factors included racial 
difference and the accused’s recent arrival to Canada from St. Vincent. On the facts, the court 
deemed the accused to have taken reasonable steps to ascertain her age, and acquitted him of 
sexual assault and sexual interference.  
— R. v. Garraway, 2010 ONCJ 642, 92 W.C.B. (2d) 210. 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The court accepted that the 
accused, who was 18, honestly believed that the complainant was 15, and not 12. The 
complainant’s Facebook profile indicated that she was 15, and the accused confirmed that the 
 67 
complainant’s birthday was the one listed on Facebook, without confirming the year. There was 
a reasonable doubt about the complainant’s evidence that she had told the accused her age. 
The Crown argued that it would be obvious to a reasonable person that information on 
Facebook is not necessarily true. This argument was partially rejected, with the court finding 
that it would have been sensible to be sceptical of information found on Facebook, but that the 
information available on Facebook is not so unreliable that no reasonable person would have 
relied on it. 
— R. v. D.O., 2017 ONSC 2027, [2017] O.J. No. 1787. 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The accused, who was 20 
at the time, had sex with the 14-year-old complainant. The accused had significant learning 
disabilities, and was immature for his age. He and the complainant were part of a group of 
friends most of whom were 17. On one occasion, the complainant told the accused’s mother, in 
front of the accused, that she was 17. The complainant’s Facebook profile indicated that she 
was 19. The Crown argued that this discrepancy should have prompted further inquiries from 
the accused, but the court rejected that argument on the basis that there was a reasonable 
doubt about what age was indicated on the profile at the relevant time. 
— R. v. Minzen, 2017 ONCJ 127, [2017] O.J. No. 1182. 
 
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age – The accused was charged 
with sexual interference and sexual assault. The court found that the complainant had pursued 
the developmentally delayed accused, who has an estimated grade four education. Taking this 
context into account, the court concluded the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the 
complainant’s age — the accused asked the complainant for her age, but “received a coy 
response”; he checked her Facebook page and found no birthdate; he knew she was attending 
high school; and his belief that she looked older than sixteen was corroborated by a photo filed 
as an exhibit. The court acquitted the accused on both charges. 
— R. v. C.G.V., [2017] O.J. No. 6485, 2017 ONCJ 850 
 
Honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s age – The accused was charged with 
sexual interference and sexual assault. “Notwithstanding that the Complainant's Facebook 
profile identified her as 16 years old and said she went to the high school in Community B, and 
she had used filters on her profile pictures to enhance her apparent age, I am satisfied that 
these factors did not cause the Accused to have an honest belief that she was 16 years old or 
older. The Accused testified that he only looked at a few of the pictures. He did not claim that 
the Complainant's Facebook profile or photographs led him to believe that she was 16.” 
— R. v. J.M., [2017] N.J. No. 223, 2017 NLTD(G) 110, 139 W.C.B. (2d) 250, para 51 
 
Sentencing – In March 2014, the offender sexually assaulted the unconscious complainant, 
and in August 2014, the offender sexually assaulted her by force. The offender recorded the 
sexual assaults and, in August 2014, posted still images from the recordings on the 
complainant’s Instagram account. The court considered whether the recording of sexual 
assaults was an aggravating factor in sentencing. The court did not consider the recording of 
the March 2014 assaults to be an aggravating factor in sentencing, as the offender was 
separately charged and convicted for that aspect of the assault under s 162. The offender was 
not charged under s 162 in relation to the August 2014 assault; therefore, the court considered 
the making and publishing of images relating to that assault to be an aggravating factor 
regarding that offence. The court also concluded that the two offences required a consecutive 
sentence, as each protected a different societal interest: privacy and bodily integrity. 
 68 
— R. v. Johnson, 2018 ONSC 5133 
  
 69 
Obtaining Sexual Services for Consideration 
 
286.1 (1) Everyone who, in any place, obtains for consideration, or communicates with 
anyone for the purpose of obtaining for consideration, the sexual services of a person is 
guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 
five years and a minimum punishment of, 
(i) in the case where the offence is committed in a public place, or in any 
place open to public view, that is or is next to a park or the grounds of a 
school or religious institution or that is or is next to any other place where 
persons under the age of 18 can reasonably be expected to be present, 
(A) for a first offence, a fine of  $2,000, and 
(B) for each subsequent offence, a fine of  $4,000, or 
(ii) in any other case, 
(A) for a first offence, a fine of  $1,000, and 
(B) for each subsequent offence, a fine of  $2,000; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than 18 months and a minimum punishment of, 
(i) in the case referred to in subparagraph (a)(i), 
(A) for a first offence, a fine of  $1,000, and 
(B) for each subsequent offence, a fine of  $2,000, or 
(ii) in any other case, 
(A) for a first offence, a fine of  $500, and 
(B) for each subsequent offence, a fine of  $1,000. 
 
Obtaining sexual services for consideration from person under 18 years 
(2) Everyone who, in any place, obtains for consideration, or communicates with anyone 
for the purpose of obtaining for consideration, the sexual services of a person under the 
age of 18 years is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of 
not more than 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 
(a) for a first offence, six months; and 
(b) for each subsequent offence, one year. 
 
Subsequent offences 
(3) In determining, for the purpose of subsection (2), whether a convicted person has 
committed a subsequent offence, if the person was earlier convicted of any of the 
following offences, that offence is to be considered as an earlier offence: 
(a) an offence under that subsection; or 
(b) an offence under subsection 212(4) of this Act, as it read from time to time 
before the day on which this subsection comes into force. 
 
Sequence of convictions only 
(4) In determining, for the purposes of this section, whether a convicted person has 
committed a subsequent offence, the only question to be considered is the sequence of 
convictions and no consideration shall be given to the sequence of commission of 
offences, whether any offence occurred before or after any conviction or whether 
offences were prosecuted by indictment or by way of summary conviction proceedings. 
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Definitions of place and public place 
(5) For the purposes of this section, place and public place have the same meaning as in 
subsection 197(1). 
2014, c. 25, s. 20. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Social media case law 
 
Reasonable steps to ascertain age of the complainant – Charged under s 286.1(2), the 
accused submitted that he thought the 16-year-old complainant was 21 because her Facebook 
page said that she was born in 1994, and because she had photos of herself with alcohol on 
Facebook. When the accused had asked the complainant her age, she failed to answer. The 
court found that the Facebook evidence was not sufficient, and that a reasonable person would 
have asked more questions. In an interview with police, the accused acknowledged several 
times that the complainant was 16. Accordingly, the accused was found guilty. 
— R. v. Alcorn, 2018 MBQB 17 
 
Facebook messages as evidence of sexual intention – The accused was charged under s 
286.1(2). The accused had sent many Facebook messages of a sexual nature to the 13-year-
old complainant. The court accepted these Facebook messages as evidence of the accused’s 
sexual interest in the complainant and the accused’s hope of establishing a sexual relationship. 
— R. v. Dawe, 2018 CarswellNfld 205 
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Public incitement of hatred 
 
319 (1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred 
against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the 
peace is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
two years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
 
Wilful promotion of hatred 
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, 
wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
two years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
 
Defences 
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2) 
(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true; 
(b) if, in good faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by an 
argument an opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a 
religious text; 
(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion 
of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believed 
them to be true; or 
(d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, matters 
producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable 
group in Canada. 
 
Forfeiture 
(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under section 318 or subsection (1) or (2) 
of this section, anything by means of or in relation to which the offence was committed, 
on such conviction, may, in addition to any other punishment imposed, be ordered by 
the presiding provincial court judge or judge to be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of the 
province in which that person is convicted, for disposal as the Attorney General may 
direct. 
 
Exemption from seizure of communication facilities 
(5) Subsections 199(6) and (7) apply with such modifications as the circumstances 
require to section 318 or subsection (1) or (2) of this section. 
 
Consent 
(6) No proceeding for an offence under subsection (2) shall be instituted without the 
consent of the Attorney General. 
 
Definitions 
(7) In this section, 
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communicating includes communicating by telephone, broadcasting or other audible or 
visible means; (communiquer) 
 
identifiable group has the same meaning as in section 318; (groupe identifiable) 
 
public place includes any place to which the public have access as of right or by 
invitation, express or implied; (endroit public) 
 
statements includes words spoken or written or recorded electronically or electro-
magnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible representations. 
(déclarations) 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 319; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 203; 2004, c. 14, s. 2. 
 
* * * * * 
 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — Ss. 319(1) and (2) each create an offence relating to hate speech. The 
offence in s. 319(1) requires that the accused 1) incite hatred by 2) communicating 3) in a public 
place 4) words likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The narrower offence in s. 319(2), 
however, requires that the accused 1) wilfully promote hatred against an identifiable group by 2) 
communicating statements, other than in private conversation. The offence in s. 319(2) requires 
the consent of the Attorney General for prosecution (s. 319(6)). S. 319(3) provides for a number 
of defences to the offence in s. 319(2). 
— R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 101 DLR (3d) 488, 49 CCC (2d) 369 (ONCA). 
 
Essential elements — Mens rea —The use of “wilfully” in s. 319(2) requires that the accused 
intend the promotion of hatred. Recklessness will not suffice.1 “Promotes” requires active 
support or instigation, and hatred involves an emotion “of an intense and extreme nature that is 
clearly associated with vilification and detestation”.2 
— 1R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 101 DLR (3d) 488, 49 CCC (2d) 369 (ONCA). 
— 2R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697, 61 CCC (3d) 1. 
 
Charter concerns — Freedom of expression — Presumption of innocence — This section 
violates s. 2(b) of the Charter, but that violation is saved by s. 1. This section violates s. 11(d) of 
the Charter, but is saved by s. 1.1 
— 1R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697, 61 CCC (3d) 1. 
 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Inciting hatred and uttering threats on Facebook — Over the course of a single afternoon 
and evening, the accused posted comments in response to a news article that had been posted 
on the official Facebook page of a leading television news broadcast. The accused expressed, 
in the comments section below the story, a desire to commit violent acts against members of 
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Québec’s Muslim minority. The accused was acquitted of uttering threats (see above), but 
convicted of inciting hatred contrary to s. 319. The judge relied in part on the responses of other 
commenters on the article to find that the accused’s comments provoked “apprehension, fear, 
and condemnation”. The judge also found that the accused’s comments were distinct from those 
of other commenters in failing to demonstrate a desire to engage in discussion, but rather to 
simply express the resentment that the accused had towards the group in question. As a freely 
accessible website for public exchange, the Facebook page in question qualified as a “public 
place” (“endroit public”) under s. 319. The defence argued that the comments did not specifically 
identify a targeted group, but the court found that the context, including where the comments 
were posted, and the posts of other commenters to which the accused responded, allowed for a 
determination that the targeted group was Muslims. The court found that the accused’s use of 
violent language, suggested use of force in order to share his intolerance, and insults towards 
those inclined towards acceptance of the Muslim community, were liable to lead to a breach of 
the peace. 
— R. c. Rioux, 2016 QCCQ 6762, 2016EXP-2527, unofficial English translation available at 
2016 CarswellQue 13004.  
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Unauthorized use of computer 
 
342.1 (1) Everyone is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term 
of not more than 10 years, or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction 
who, fraudulently and without colour of right, 
(a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service; 
(b) by means of an electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, intercepts 
or causes to be intercepted, directly or indirectly, any function of a computer 
system; 
(c) uses or causes to be used, directly or indirectly, a computer system with intent to 
commit an offence under paragraph (a) or (b) or under section 430 in relation to 
computer data or a computer system; or 
(d) uses, possesses, traffics in or permits another person to have access to a 
computer password that would enable a person to commit an offence under 
paragraph (a), (b) or (c). 
 
Definitions 
(2) In this section, 
 
computer data means representations, including signs, signals or symbols, that are in a 
form suitable for processing in a computer system; (données informatiques) 
 
computer password means any computer data by which a computer service or computer 
system is capable of being obtained or used; (mot de passe) 
 
computer program means computer data representing instructions or statements that, 
when executed in a computer system, causes the computer system to perform a 
function; (programme d’ordinateur) 
 
computer service includes data processing and the storage or retrieval of computer data; 
(service d’ordinateur) 
 
computer system means a device that, or a group of interconnected or related devices 
one or more of which, 
      (a) contains computer programs or other computer data, and 
      (b) by means of computer programs, 
            (i) performs logic and control, and 
            (ii) may perform any other function; (ordinateur) 
   
data [Repealed, 2014, c. 31, s. 16] 
 
electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device means any device or apparatus 
that is used or is capable of being used to intercept any function of a computer system, 
but does not include a hearing aid used to correct subnormal hearing of the user to not 
better than normal hearing; (dispositif électromagnétique, acoustique, mécanique ou 
autre) 
 
function includes logic, control, arithmetic, deletion, storage and retrieval and 
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communication or telecommunication to, from or within a computer system; (fonction) 
 
intercept includes listen to or record a function of a computer system, or acquire the 
substance, meaning or purport thereof; (intercepter) 
 
traffic means, in respect of a computer password, to sell, export from or import into 
Canada, distribute or deal with in any other way. (trafic) 
 
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 45; 1997, c. 18, s. 18; 2014, c. 31, s. 16. 
 
* * * * * 
General case law 
 
Essential elements — This section creates four offences: 1) “obtaining” a computer service or 
system under s. 342.1(1)(a), 2) “interception” of, or causing to be intercepted, any function of a 
computer system, which must be made by the specified means, under s. 342.1(1)(b), 3) “using” 
or causing to be used, directly or indirectly a computer system, with the accompanying mens 
rea that the use be with intent to commit the specified offences, under s. 342.1(1)(c), and 4) 
“enabling”, by using, possessing, trafficking, or allowing another person access to a computer 
password that would enable that person to commit an offence under subs. (a), (b), or (c).  
 
Essential elements — s. 342.1(1)(a) — The actus reus of the offence in s. 342.1(1)(a) requires 
that the accused obtained computer services, that that utilization was prohibited, that a 
reasonable person in the same situation would have concluded that the activity was dishonest, 
and that the act was done without colour of right. The mens rea required by the s. 342.1(1)(a) 
offence is that the accused consciously and voluntarily obtained computer services. This 
requires proof of intention to do the prohibited act, knowing that that act was prohibited by 
reference to the intended ends of the usage of the computer system.1 
— 1R. c. Parent, 2012 QCCA 1653, [2012] R.J.Q. 1817. 
 
Meaning of “computer system” – “Computer system” appears to include text messaging via 
cellular phones,1 though it has also been found that a Blackberry is not a “computer system”, 
absent any expert evidence on this point.2 
— 1R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610, 107 O.R. (3d) 81. 
— 2R. v. Cockell, 2013 ABCA 112, 553 A.R. 91. 
 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Definition of “computer system” — A computer and Facebook account used to send 
messages constitute a “computer system” within the meaning of s. 342.1 of the Criminal Code. 
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302. 
 
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court 
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time 
ago”; we better understand now the severe impact online sexual exploitation can have on 
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children (para. 17). Consequently, the court “must resort to imprisonment, emphasizing the 
sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and dismissed the accused’s 
argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18). 
— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing 
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other 
offences. In determining his high moral blameworthiness, the court noted the accused’s “use of 
the internet…have [sic] elements of disturbing online sexual harassment – an adult criminally 
cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless unknown entity,” he was also 
“all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).    
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545.  
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Extortion 
 
346 (1) Every one commits extortion who, without reasonable justification or excuse and 
with intent to obtain anything, by threats, accusations, menaces or violence induces or 
attempts to induce any person, whether or not he is the person threatened, accused or 
menaced or to whom violence is shown, to do anything or cause anything to be done. 
 
Extortion 
(1.1) Every person who commits extortion is guilty of an indictable offence and liable 
(a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the 
offence or if any firearm is used in the commission of the offence and the offence 
is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal 
organization, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of 
(i) in the case of a first offence, five years, and 
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, seven years; 
(a.1) in any other case where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to 
imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 
four years; and 
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for life. 
  
Subsequent offences 
(1.2) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (1.1)(a), whether a convicted person 
has committed a second or subsequent offence, if the person was earlier convicted of 
any of the following offences, that offence is to be considered as an earlier offence: 
(a) an offence under this section; 
(b) an offence under subsection 85(1) or (2) or section 244 or 244.2; or 
(c) an offence under section 220, 236, 239, 272 or 273, subsection 279(1) or section 
279.1 or 344 if a firearm was used in the commission of the offence. 
 
However, an earlier offence shall not be taken into account if 10 years have elapsed 
between the day on which the person was convicted of the earlier offence and the day on 
which the person was convicted of the offence for which sentence is being imposed, not 
taking into account any time in custody. 
 
Sequence of convictions only 
(1.3) For the purposes of subsection (1.2), the only question to be considered is the 
sequence of convictions and no consideration shall be given to the sequence of 
commission of offences or whether any offence occurred before or after any conviction. 
 
Saving 
(2) A threat to institute civil proceedings is not a threat for the purposes of this section. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 346; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 46; 1995, c. 39, s. 150; 2008, c. 6, 
s. 33; 2009, c. 22, s. 15. 
 
* * * * * 
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General case law 
 
Essential elements — The actus reus is made out when the accused 1) induced or attempted 
to induce someone to do something or cause something to be done; 2) by using threats, 
accusations, menaces, or violence; 3) without reasonable justification or excuse. The mens rea 
of this offence is intending to obtain “anything” by the actus reus. The accused’s conduct must 
be viewed in its entirety and in context.1 “Anything” has a “wide, unrestricted dictionary 
definition, and includes sexual favours.”2 “Attempting to induce” will constitute the full offence of 
extortion (not merely attempted extortion), even if the victim does not surrender to the accused’s 
wishes.3 
— 1R. v. Barros, 2011 SCC 51, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 368. 
— 2R. v. Davis, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 759, S.C.J. No. 67, para. 43. 
— 3R. v. Noël, 2001 NBCA 80, 239 N.B.R. (2d) 269. 
 
Defining threats — The accused need not threaten to injure the victim personally; an 
accused’s false statement that a third party with violent propensities or associations will deal 
with the victim is sufficient to constitute a threat.1 A veiled reference may constitute a threat if, in 
light of the particular context, it sufficiently conveys to the victim the consequences that the 
victim fears or would prefer to avoid.2  
— 1R. v. Swartz (1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 409, 1 W.C.B. 336 (ONCA). 
— 2R. v. Barros, 2011 SCC 51, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 368. 
 
Defining reasonable justification or excuse — A reasonable justification or excuse is both 
fact and offence specific. It “refers to some matter that is extraneous to the existence of the 
essential elements of the offence that justifies or excuses actions that would otherwise 
constitute the crime.” The burden is on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
absence of any reasonable justification or excuse. The question is not whether the particular 
accused believed his threats were reasonably justified or excusable, but whether a reasonable 
person in the accused’s position would have formed that view.1 The reasonable justification or 
excuse must be not only for the demand, but also for the making of threats or menaces by 
which the accused sought to compel compliance with the demand.2  
— 1R. v. H.A. (2005), 202 O.A.C. 54, 206 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (ONCA), para. 72-74. 
— 2R. v. Natarelli, [1967] S.C.R. 539, 1 C.C.C. 154. 
 
* * * * * 
Social media case law 
 
Definition of “Doxing” —“Doxing involves publishing on the internet identifiable personal 
information about an individual that has usually been obtained from social media sites and from 
hacking into private systems. Depending on the nature of the information, its disclosure can 
cause the victim distress, fear, embarrassment and shame. The personal information can be 
used by others to facilitate identity theft and fraud. The threat to publish private information can 
also be used by the person who holds the information for extortion and blackmail purposes.”  
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 3. 
 
Definition of “Swatting” —“Swatting involves tricking an emergency service agency into 
dispatching an emergency response based on a false report of an ongoing critical incident. 
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Swatting can lead to the deployment of a range of emergency response teams including police, 
fire and bomb squads and the evacuation of businesses, schools or other public institutions.”  
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 4. 
 
Party liability through fake Facebook accounts — The accused created a fake Facebook 
account to converse with the complainant. The accused’s friend used the account by remotely 
accessing the accused’s computer, and proceeded to threaten the complainant with distributing 
semi-nude and nude photos of her, unless she produced another picture. By permitting his 
friend remote access to the computer and enabling him to assume the fake Facebook identity, 
the court found the accused facilitated extortion.  
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 14, 357 N.S.R. (2d) 340. 
 
Fabrication of Facebook messages – Complainant’s consent to distribution of images – 
The Crown’s position was that the accused attempted to extort the complainant using intimate 
images of her, and that he posted two such images on Facebook and Skype without her 
consent. The court found that, despite the complainant’s testimony to the contrary, she had 
sufficient knowledge of computers such that she could have accessed the accused’s Facebook 
account and feigned the offending messages which were presented at trial. The court also 
found that the complainant may have given blanket consent for the accused to post intimate 
images during their relationship. If her consent was later withdrawn, the Crown failed to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the relevant images were still on the Internet at 
that time. The accused was acquitted on both counts. 
— R. v. Sobh, 2018 ONSC 2299 
 
Establishing the identity of the accused – The complainant met someone named “Beau” on 
Tinder, and after initial communication, sent him a picture of her breasts through Snapchat. 
Beau saved the picture in a screenshot and used it to attempt to extort sexual favours from the 
complainant. The complainant began to suspect the Beau was the accused, Cody Penney — 
she had reviewed the accused’s Twitter page, finding similarities in the messages she had 
received from Beau. The defence argued that all the evidence linking the accused to “Beau” 
was circumstantial, and equally consistent with “someone posing as [the accused] on the 
internet”. The court rejected this argument, find that, on the facts, the only reasonable inference 
was that the accused was indeed “Beau”. The accused was convicted of extortion, uttering 
threats, and harassment. 
— R. v. Penney, [2017] N.J. No. 241, para 38 
 
Sentencing – “[A] present day threat to release intimate photographs through social media cites 
allows for the sharing and dissemination of such photographs on a worldwide basis. This 
technology also makes it impossible for the victim to limit circulation or to retrieve the 
photographs. This modern day form of extortion is much different and more serious than older 
forms of extortion. The sentencing for such offences must reflect the changes in the sharing of 
information and the impact upon victims. General deterrence and denunciation must be the 
primary principles of sentencing applied.”  
— R. v. Hunt, [2017] N.J. No. 430, para 8 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, possession of child pornography, and 
11 counts of extortion. The terms of his 18-month probation included, among other things: not 
possessing or using any computer or other device that has Internet access, except with 
 80 
advance written permission; monitored use of Internet access, if granted; and the accused’s 
identification by his full real name when communicating with anyone by means including 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or any other social network.  
— R. v. R.W., 2016 ONCJ 325, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 68. 
 
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of extortion, possession of child pornography, and 
possession of child pornography for the purpose of distribution. Among other things, his 
conditional discharge order prohibited accessing any Internet-based social media. The court 
was concerned social media restrictions may impair the accused’s ability to overcome his social 
anxiety and reintegrate”, but the nature of the accused’s offending made “it inappropriate to 
permit social media access” unless and until rehabilitative progress is made (para. 56).   
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 66, 366 N.S.R. (2d) 57. 
 
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court 
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time 
ago”; we better understand now the severe impact online sexual exploitation can have on 
children (para. 17). Consequently, the court “must resort to imprisonment, emphasizing the 
sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and dismissed the accused’s 
argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18). 
— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1. 
 
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing 
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other 
offences. In determining his high moral blameworthiness, the court noted the accused’s “use of 
the internet…have [sic] elements of disturbing online sexual harassment – an adult criminally 
cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless unknown entity,” he was also 
“all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).    
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545. 
 
 
